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ABSTRACT 
This thesis assesses the political and military challenges facing the Republic of Moldova, 
as an armed neutral in the regional security architecture of the Black Sea Basin. The 
eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European 
Union (EU) has turned the Black Sea region into an area of overlapping partnerships, 
programs, and projects geared toward stabilization, development, and preparation for 
integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.  
Past experience shows that national security is closely connected to regional 
security, which requires close attention to political, economic, social, cultural, diplomatic, 
ethnic, and energy factors. The new geopolitical configuration in the Black Sea region 
presents both challenges and opportunities for Moldova to promote regional and national 
security through bilateral cooperation with neighboring countries and broader 
international engagement and relations with the European Union and NATO.  
In view of this complex situation, the pursuit of a policy of armed neutrality may 
be the best approach for promoting the national interest and security of Moldova. Such 
political positioning would provide the country with opportunities for working efficiently 
with both neighboring nations and the West, as well as maintaining good relations with 
the dominant political, military, and economic force in the region—the Russian 
Federation. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the political and military challenges that the 
Republic of Moldova has, as an armed neutral, in the regional security architecture of the 
Black Sea Basin. The eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the European Union (EU) has turned the Black Sea region into an area of 
numerous—and overlapping—partnerships, programs, and projects geared toward 
stabilization and development, as well as preparation for integration into Euro-Atlantic 
institutions. Security cooperation, as well as economic, political, and military 
development—have become the main concerns of the states in the Black Sea region.  
The new geopolitical configuration in the Black Sea region presents both 
challenges and opportunities for the Republic of Moldova to promote regional and 
national security through bilateral cooperation with neighboring countries and broader 
international engagement and relations with the European Union and NATO. Since 1991, 
when the Soviet Union dissolved, the security concerns of the Republic of Moldova, 
which is a small country located between Ukraine and Romania,1 have been generally 
intertwined with the interests and policies of larger regional actors, some of which seek to 
influence the internal situation and foreign policy of the nation. In view of this complex 
situation, the pursuit of a policy of armed neutrality may be the best approach for 
promoting the national interest and security of the Republic of Moldova. Such political 
positioning would provide the country with opportunities for working efficiently with 
both neighboring nations and the West, as well as maintaining good relations with the 
dominant political, military, and economic force in the region, the Russian Federation. 
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of the security 
role that the Republic of Moldova can play as an armed neutral country in the Black Sea 
region. Past experience shows that national security is closely connected to regional 
1 Central Intelligence Agency, “Republic of Moldova,” World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/md.html. 
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security, which requires close attention to political, economic, social, cultural, diplomatic, 
environmental, ethnical, and energy factors. Such an approach to national security 
considers the political-military challenges that the Republic of Moldova faces in the 
broader context of security in the Black Sea Basin, as well as the ramifications of this 
security sphere. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The collapse of communism in Southeast Europe and the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in the years 1989–1991 have opened a new era in the history of the Black 
Sea countries. From a geopolitical perspective, this area is located at the intersection of 
three crucial areas: the former Soviet Union to the East, the expanded Middle East to the 
South, and the West, represented by NATO and the European Union; see Figure 1. Thus, 
the Black Sea region is seen as a “strategic bridge connecting Europe with the Caspian 
Sea area, Central Asia, and the Middle East.”2 The Black Sea Basin, which also links 
Southeast Asia and China (Silk Road),3 is rich in natural resources and has great 
economic potential, although political rivalries in the region threaten stability.4 
Therefore, establishing good relations among the countries in the Black Sea Basin is of 
the utmost importance to guarantee the security in the area. 
Amid the process of redefining Europe and transforming NATO, the Black Sea 
region also represents a challenge for the West. The aim is to reshape the region for the 
purposes of securing and anchoring democratic ideals and values, thus contributing to 
strengthening peace and stability in the region. Recent changes in the security 
environment in the Balkans, South Caucasus, and the former Soviet states exerted a direct 
2 Central Intelligence Agency, “Republic of Moldova,” World Factbook. 
3 Teimuraz Gorshkov and George Bagaturia, “TRACECA—Restoration of Silk Route,” Central Asian 
Railway and Europe—Asian Land Bridge, Japan Railway and Transport Review 28, September 2001, 
http://www.jrtr.net/jrtr28/pdf/f50_gor.pdf. 
4 Central Intelligence Agency, “Republic of Moldova,” World Factbook. 
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influence on the evolution of security in the Black Sea region. The wider Black Sea Basin 
has major strategic significance for the EU and Euro-Atlantic community as a whole.5 
 
Figure 1.  Map of converging EU policies in the Black Sea region.6 
The Republic of Moldova was one of the states that emerged after the Soviet 
Union collapsed. The new democratic government has established different working 
relationships with the actors in the Black Sea region. Still, the Republic of Moldova 
should be more actively involved in regional security processes. As a state with European 
aspirations, the country is restructuring its government systems to contribute more 
5 European Parliament, “Resolution of 20 January 2011 on an EU Strategy for the Black Sea 
(2010/2087(INI),” European Parliament Text Adopted, January 20, 2011 – Strasbourg, 
http://www.blackseanews.net/en/read/48717. 
6 European Parliament, Policy Briefing the EU’s Black Sea Policy: Where Do We Stand? Policy 
Department Directorate-General for External Policies, September 2013 (Belgium, EU: DG 




                                                 
actively to regional security. Some of the reforms that the Republic of Moldova has 
implemented so far have included promoting democracy and regional economic 
integration, ensuring civilian control over armed forces, and adjusting national legislation 
to European standards.7  
As strategic partner, the United States and the Republic of Moldova established 
multilateral relations in 1991 when Moldova became an independent country. U.S. 
officials have constantly supported “Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity 
within its internationally recognized borders.”8 Secretary of State John Kerry visited 
Moldova in 2013 to reassure the country of U.S. support in its continued pursuit of 
European integration. The United States and the European Union have been trying to 
connect Moldova’s economy westwards to diminish the impact of potential Russian 
embargoes.9  
Recent visits by high-ranking EU officials to the Moldovan capital Chisinau, as 
well as official meetings in Washington between Moldovan Prime Minister Iurie Leanca 
and President Obama and top U.S. leaders reiterated American support for Moldova as a 
Western and Europe-friendly neutral with cultural and linguistic connections to Russia.10 
In view of recent political developments in the region, particularly in Ukraine, Moldova 
has become increasingly important because of the buffer-zone function it could play 
politically and geographically in the case of future expansion of the Russian Federation. 
Such concerns underscore the growing importance of the Republic of Moldova in the 
developing security architecture of the Black Sea Basin. 
7 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Moldova Strategy,” EBRD Countries, 
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/country/moldova/strategy.shtml. 
8 Steven Woehrel, Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, CRS Report No. RS21918, 2014), 8, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21981.pdf. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 9. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Small states are generally forced to promote smart security policies. Research 
suggests that “neutrality is still a mainly European trend, used by the small states as a 
national security strategy.”11 However, the Republic of Moldova and its geographic 
position challenge these expectations. Moldova is facing a security problem oscillating 
between East and West and guaranteeing sovereignty. The existing security options that 
Moldova has adopted are embodied in the constitution; the “permanent neutrality” of the 
Republic of Moldova is proclaimed in Article 11 of the country’s constitution.12 
Risks that threaten the security of the Black Sea Basin start with the challenges 
arising after the reconstruction of states following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Although maintaining social harmony among various religious and ethnic groups is a 
serious concern, the biggest security considerations involve preserving territorial 
integrity, developing economic capacity, and securing energy supplies. For example, the 
Black Sea region is part of an important transportation corridor for delivering oil and gas 
from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to Western markets. In a green paper adopted in 
March 2006, the European Commission recognized the strategic need for developing 
such transportation infrastructure in the region, particularly to provide EU countries with 
alternatives to Russian energy supplies.13 Other concerns include combating human 
trafficking, as well as the trade in drugs and arms, controlling cross-border crime and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.14 These problems have a direct impact on 
the internal security of the Republic of Moldova, as well as at the regional level, and 
extend even internationally. 
11 Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States (London; New York: Routledge, 1988), 7. 
12 Constitution of The Republic of Moldova, Article 11, Adopted on July 29, 1994, (this translation by 
the author). http://lex.justice.md/document_rom.php?id=44B9F30E:7AC17731. 
13 Commission of the European Communities, “Commission Staff Working Document: Summary 
Report on the Analysis of the Debate on the Green Paper,” A European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy, Brussels, December 16, 2006, SEC (2006) 1500, 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2006/doc/sec_2006_1500.pdf. 
14 Iris Kempe and Kurt Klotzle, “The Balkans and the Black Sea Region: Problems, Potentials, and 
Policy Options,” Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research CAP Policy Analyses, No. 2 (2006): 6, 
http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2238/pdf/CAP_Policy_Analysis_2006_02.pdf. 
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Among the global and regional high-risk threats to the security and stability in the 
Black Sea area, the “frozen conflicts”15 remain as the main danger for regional security. 
Numerous conflicts in the Black Sea Basin could escalate at any time, including tensions 
in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in Georgia between Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, and in the Transnistrian16 region in Moldova, which has been 
threatened by separatist movements.17 Also, these areas of frozen conflicts are the best 
places for terrorist organizations, organized crime, human and arms trafficking, 
discouraging international investment in these countries and ruining the economy, thus 
creating instability in the Black Sea Basin.18 So, identifying the solutions for these 
conflicts will contribute significantly to the security in the Black Sea Basin region. 
One hypothesis to be explored in this thesis is that political and military 
dimensions play a central role in the security challenges in the Black Sea region. For the 
Republic of Moldova, multilateral cooperation with the European Union, neighboring 
countries, and the Russian Federation as well, will propagate regional stability and 
increase security in the Black Sea Basin. Research for this thesis will begin by 
considering the following essentials of the existing options on which the Republic of 
Moldova has based its geopolitical situation, security problems, development of the 
country, and energy dependency. Moldova’s role in the regional security architecture of 
the Black Sea Basin is not enormous, but it is worth taking into consideration. Its 
geographical position, as well as its historical background, position Moldova to play a 
central role of honest broker between the European Union and East, and contribute to 
regional security. 
15 Up to the present time in the literature there is still no clear definition of a frozen conflict. In 
general, we can say that a frozen conflict is a fluctuating, unstable security environment in areas where 
conflicts during their existence have not seen a legitimate mechanism of final settlement, and after 
persistent disagreements between the parties involved, these conflicts can be reinitiated at any time. Also, 
apart from the phrase “frozen conflict,” in this context a similar expression can be used—latent conflicts—
which are unresolved, prolonged, and stagnant. 
16 Transnistria is referred to differently in various literature; contemporary literature uses 
Transdnestira, Pridnestrovie, and Pridnestrovskoe Moldsvskaya Respublika (PMR). I will use Transnistria, 
which is used in the political system of the Republic of Moldova. 
17 Kempe and Klotzle, “The Balkans and the Black Sea Region: Problems, Potentials, and Policy 
Options,” 8‒9. 
18 Ibid., 9. 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The search for existing studies on the role of the Republic of Moldova as an 
armed neutral in the regional security architecture of the Black Sea Basin, as well as its 
political and military dimensions, reveals few relevant titles.19 The small amount of 
specialized literature that exists is not comprehensive and addresses the situation in the 
Republic of Moldova only partially.  
There are, admittedly, several reasons for this lack of attention. The country’s 
small size, land-locked position, energy dependence on Russia, involvement in frozen 
conflicts, and other diplomatic concerns have, until recently, kept it cut off from the 
international spotlight. The Republic of Moldova, which as a regional actor, does not 
have the necessary strength to influence some security aspects in the region. Political and 
economic weakness, as well as Moldova’s energy dependence, makes this a taboo 
subject, in part because Moldova depends largely on Russian gas and export. This reality 
necessitated a “diplomatic” approach to the topic, avoiding political, economic and ethnic 
problems in the country.  
The country’s cautious approach to security and neutrality issues is another reason 
that the country has kept a low profile. Most recently, because of the Transniestrian 
19 Svante Cornell, Anna Jonsson, Niklas Nilsson, and Per Häggström, “The Wider Black Sea Region: 
An Emerging Hub in European Security,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 
(2006), http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0612Blacksea_P.pdf; Intra - Regional 
Perspectives on the Back Sea Affairs, Discussion Papers # 4, The Black Sea Region: A Security Minefield 
or a Partnership Road (Bucharest: Cartier, 2009), http://www.fes-
moldova.org/media/publications/2009/The%20Black%20Sea%20Region%20(a%20security%20minefield
%20or%20a%20partnership%20road).pdf; Ronald D. Asmus, Next Step in Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy 
for the Wider Black Sea (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2006); Iulian 
Chifu, Adriana Sauliuc, and Bogdan Nedea, Energy Security Strategies in the Wider Black Sea Region 
(Bucharest: Editura Curtea Veche, 2010); Mustafa Aydin, “Europe’s Next Shore: The Black Sea Region 
after EU Enlargement,” Occasional Paper, no. 53 (2004); Ariel Cohen and Irwin Conway, “U.S. Strategy in 
the Black Sea Region” Backgrounder, no. 1990 (2006); Kempe and Klotzle, “The Balkans and the Black 
Sea Region: Problems, Potentials, and Policy Options,” 6; Dan Dungaciu, “Geopolitics and Security in the 
Black Sea - Romania and Moldova Strategic Options, Security and Stability in the Black Sea,” 
International Scientific Session, National Defense University, Center for Defense and Strategic Studies 
Security, Bucharest, 2005; Oleg Serebrian, Politics and Geopolitics (Bucharest: Cartier, 2004); George 
Cristian Maior and Sergei Konoplyov, Strategic Knowledge in the Wider Black Sea Area (Bucharest: 
Biblioteca RAO, 2011); Grinevetskiy, Sergei R., Sergei S. Jhilzov and Igori S. Zonn, The Black Sea Knot, 
Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya Publishers, 2007. 
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conflict,20 which has been frozen for more than 20 years, the government’s approach has 
been to avoid an eventual armed conflict. Because of the lack of coverage in the 
literature,21 particularly in view of current events in the region, this thesis is important for 
filling a research void and for presenting a view of the role that the Republic of Moldova 
can play in the Black Sea Basin.  
The topic of security in the Black Sea area has been widely discussed in the 
specialized literature and primarily prepared by European institutions, such as the 
European Parliament22 and the Commission of European Communities.23 However, the 
literature has generally focused on the countries in the region that have direct access to 
the Black Sea. The Republic of Moldova, being a landlocked country, has been generally 
studied jointly with other regional states.24 
20 Woehrel, Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21981.pdf. The 
Transnistria conflict is a dispute that started in March 1991, between Moldovan legal forces and the 
separatist region. The self-proclaimed “Dniestr Republic” was created in 1990 by ethnic Russians, and is 
so-called now the Moldavian Transnistrian region. The conflict active phase lasted less than a year during 
which hundreds of people died and homes and infrastructure were destroyed. In July 1992 there was a 
ceasefire and the Transnistrian conflict became a “frozen conflict,” establishing a “security zone” and a 
peacekeeping mission on the Dniester River. The peacekeeping forces have more than 400 personnel from 
four sides (Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Transnistrian separatists). Also, a problem-solving mechanism 
was created for this conflict, represented by the 5+2 format. Part of the 5 +2 format includes five mediators 
and two observers in the negotiation process – the Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine, the 
OSCE, Transnistria (mediators), and the United States and European Union (observers). 
21 The last NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012 (http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/170/art15-
Lungu.php) discussed the new dynamics of military security in the Black Sea region, as well as various 
security work conducted by the European Union Parliament and Security Europe newsletters 
(http://www.seceur.info/en/security-europe-newsletter.html) that covered broader security topics in the 
region, avoided  including the Republic of Moldova in those studies or workshops because of the limited 
role that Moldova can play in the Black Sea security architecture.  
22 European Parliament, “Resolution of 20 January 2011 on an EU Strategy for the Black Sea 
(2010/2087(INI),” European Parliament text adopted, January 20, 2011 – Strasbourg, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-
0025+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.  
23 Commission of the European Communities, “Commission Staff Working Document: Summary 
Report on the Analysis of the Debate on the Green Paper, “A European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy,” Brussels, November 16, 2006, 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2006/doc/sec_2006_1500.pdf. 
24 Library of Congress Country Studies Federal Research Division, “A Country Study: Moldova,” 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/mdtoc.html#md0016.  
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Regarding regional security, Iris Kempe and Kurt Klotzle25 provide a broad 
overview of the problems and the policy options available to address these challenges in 
the Black Sea and Balkans. Their policy analysis studies the risks and challenges inside 
and outside of the Euro-Atlantic area, presenting the argument that the absence of 
implementing effective security policies specific to this region can lead to major security 
problems for the European Union, Black Sea, and Balkans.26  
From a different perspective, Fiona Houston, Duncan Wood, and Derek M. 
Robinson27 focus on threats to regional security posed by the illicit trafficking of 
counterfeit merchandise, weapons, and drugs. Security threats arising from radioactive 
materials and territorial disputes also are addressed in their work. Their book titled Black 
Sea Security International Cooperation and Counter-Trafficking in the Black Sea Region 
is based on a NATO seminar held at Oxford University, which was attended by various 
officials from the Black Sea region. The work, besides addressing the security challenges 
to this area, looks at the potential implementation of dynamic security architecture in the 
Black Sea Basin, mentioning the importance of cooperation in law enforcement and 
counter-trafficking among Black Sea countries. Also, this book provides various 
solutions to the Black Sea security problems through cooperation processes, such as 
coordination on the national and regional level among Black Sea countries, inter-
ministerial support, and creation of a forum in the Black Sea region dedicated to these 
security problems.28 This book retains to some extent the ideas of previously cited 
literature, such as Kempe and Klotzle, yet promotes certain solutions and suggestions to 
the Black Sea Basin problems; therefore, it provides valuable insight into the security 
architecture in the region for this thesis. 
25 Kempe and Klotzle, “The Balkans and the Black Sea Region: Problems, Potentials, and Policy 
Options,” 6. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Fiona Houston, W. Duncan Wood, and Derek M. Robinson, Black Sea Security International 
Cooperation and Counter-Trafficking in the Black Sea Region (Washington, DC: IOS Press, 2010). 
28 Ibid. 
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In the same context, the Republic of Moldova National Security Strategy adopted 
on July 15, 2011,29 presents the main general security strategies of Moldova. This 
document, based on the national Security Concept, outlines a “system of ideas that shape 
national security state priorities” and defines national security objectives, regulation, 
standards, and security strategies on both national and international levels.30 The 
National Strategy is a policy act that identifies major national security threats and 
specifies counter-actions. Neutrality is very little discussed in this strategy; it is only 
mentioned in the context of Moldova-NATO cooperation, and the possible security roles 
that the Republic of Moldova can play in the regional architecture is discussed in general 
terms, lacking clear and detailed explanations of Moldova’s security roles and 
missions.31  
Dan Dungaciu,32 in parallel with Oleg Serebrian33 and Ionut Gaidau,34 focuses on 
the actual security architecture in the Black Sea region. For example, Dan Dungaciu in 
his work The Emerging Security Environment in the Black Sea Area: Strategic Options 
for Romania and Moldova highlights the possible causes of insecurity in the Black Sea 
region, and potential security strategies for Moldova through neighboring countries, 
especially Romania.35 The Transnistrian conflict and ethnic problems in Moldova are the 
main insecurity causes in the region, and the author sees NATO membership as a 
strategic course of the Republic of Moldova and suggests rethinking neutrality status. 
Also, Oleg Serebrian more broadly addresses the connected nature of security and 
politics in the book Politics and Geopolitics, promoting an idea of national security that 
is closely related to political will. 
29 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, “Decision no. 153 of the Parliament of 
Republic of Moldova on July 15, 2011,” (this translation by the author). 
30 Republic of Moldova Parliament, “Republic of Moldova National Security Concept, May 5, 1995,” 
http://www.mfa.gov.md/img/docs/national-security-concept-of-the-RM.doc. 
31 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, Moldova 
Government, http://www.mfa.gov.md/start-page-en/.  
32 Dungaciu, “Geopolitics and Security in the Black Sea.” 
33 Serebrian, Politics and Geopolitics. 
34 Ionut Gaidau, “Black Sea Region‒Geopolitical Space,” Cadran Politic (Magazine of Analysis and 
Political Information), December 19, 2009, http://www.cadranpolitic.ro/?p=4007.  
35 Dungaciu, “Geopolitics and Security in the Black Sea.” 
 10 
                                                 
In the article “Black Sea Region—Geopolitical Space,” Ionut Gaidau explains the 
geopolitical interests in the Black Sea region in terms of their importance for transporting 
energy, projecting power, and shielding Europe from asymmetric threats. All those 
factors enumerated earlier have a significant impact on the national security of the 
Republic of Moldova and delineates its role in regional security, as the Republic of 
Moldova is implicitly a part of this geopolitical space. 
Collectively, the research of the authors noted previously offers a starting point 
from which this thesis tackles the research question. They provide an “analytical 
mainframe of the regional security”36 and emphasize the security challenges in the Black 
Sea Basin. 
Also, a few recent publications provide a broad overview of the research topic. 
The book In the Wider Black Sea Area Strategic Goals and Security Policy,37 by George 
Cristian Maior and Sergei Konoplyov, address security issues in the Wider Black Sea 
area (WBSA). The first chapter—edited by George Cristian Maior, director of the 
Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), and Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu, director of the 
Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service—tackles “strategic goals and security policy”38 
in the Black Sea Basin. They emphasize “confrontation between old and new rivalries”39 
and stress the need for managing uncertainty in the Black Sea area.40 The second 
chapter—written by Razvan Nicolescu, head of Corporate Petrom and Vice-president of 
European Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulation, Vladimir Socor, of the 
Jamestown Foundation, and Ana Ligia Leaua, adviser of SRI director—discusses “energy 
security, environment, and demography issues.”41 The third chapter—written by Bogdan 
Aurescu, Romanian state secretary for European affairs and Gheorghe Savu, general 
director of Romanian Defense Intelligence, Ministry of National Defense—addresses 
36 Dungaciu, “Geopolitics and Security in the Black Sea,” 4. 
37 Maior and Konoplyov, Strategic Knowledge in the Wider Black Sea Area. 
38 Ibid., 19. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 28. 
41 Ibid., 95. 
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security challenges in the Wider Black Sea42 and examines security patterns in the area.43 
The final chapter—written by Florian Coldea, first deputy director SRI, Sergiu Medar, 
National Security Advisor to the President of Romania, and Cristian Dincovici, deputy 
director Romanian Military Intelligence—emphasizes the importance of security services 
and their contribution to stability in the Black Sea Basin. Their work also goes on to 
discuss the role of the intelligence services and their contribution to regional security. 
Neutrality is a notion widely used in international law. Neutral states cannot 
participate in war with other states or take part in different military blocs as belligerents. 
There are two types of neutrality: permanent and temporary, also known in some sources 
as wartime and peacetime neutrality. Countries like Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden 
enforce neutrality in different ways. For example, Austria conceives of its neutrality as a 
“constitutional value,” rather than a formal, legal status, particularly now that Austria 
participates in collective security in the international environment, notably in 
peacekeeping missions in the Middle East and different African countries. On the other 
hand, Switzerland has a more serious approach to its neutrality status. Neutrality is 
embedded in Swiss history and security policy. Also, Swiss neutrality is directly linked 
with the country’s national interests and represents the security and stability instrument 
that Switzerland uses for its security.44  
The neutrality concept in the security context is depicted in a number of different 
ways. According to Lassa Oppenheim in International Law: War and Neutrality,45 there 
are various types of neutrality. Perpetual neutrality is based on a special treaty that 
ensures the state’s neutrality. General and partial neutrality is when an entire state 
territory has neutral status, but in some cases only part of state territory is neutral, for 
instance, by some agreement. Voluntary neutrality is when the state is adopting the 
neutral status voluntarily, and conventional is when there is a specific treaty that forces 
42 Maior and Konoplyov, Strategic Knowledge in the Wider Black Sea Area, 168. 
43 Ibid., 175. 
44 Central Intelligence Agency, “Switzerland,” World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sz.html.  
45 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: War and Neutrality (London: Longmans Green and Co., 
1906), 323‒327. 
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the state to stay neutral. Armed neutrality is when a state adopts military measures to 
ensure its neutrality; benevolent neutrality is described by the neutral manners of a state, 
and absolute vs. qualified neutrality assumes supporting one of the belligerents.46  
The concept of the armed neutrality, which is of particular interest to this thesis, 
has been defined in international politics as an “attitude of a state or group of states which 
makes no alliance with either side in a war.”47 By comparison, Georg Schwarzenberger 
in Manual of International Law has explained neutrality in terms of military actions taken 
to defend a sovereign territory.48 He gives the example of Switzerland’s armed neutrality 
during the Franco-German War. Also, Schwarzenberger describes another form of the 
armed neutrality characterized by defending the status of neutrality from other 
belligerents.49  
In the context of the Black Sea Basin, several authors also have generally 
discussed the importance of neutrality for the security of small states. Works by authors 
Karsh Efraim,50 Joseph Kruzel, and Haltzel H. Michael51 provide useful comparative 
study and analysis on small states and how they use neutrality for their security. Efraim, 
in Neutrality and Small States, examines the experience of small neutral states during the 
World War II and their implications, in general in the international arena. Additionally, 
Michael Haltzel, in Between the Blocs, studies today’s European neutrals like Austria, 
Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland with their national security challenges and traditions. 
Also, Laurent F. Carrel,52 Heinz Vetschera,53 David S. Brackett,54 and Philip Windsor,55 
46 Oppenheim, International Law: War and Neutrality, 323‒327. 
47 U.S. Legal, “Armed Neutrality Law & Legal Definition,” Legal Definitions, 
http://definitions.uslegal.com/a/armed-neutrality/.  
48 Georg Schwarzenberger, Manual of International Law (London: Milton/Oxon, Professional Books 
Ltd., 1976), 177‒78. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States (London; New York: Routledge, 1988). 
51 Kruzel, Joseph and Haltzel H. Michael, Between the Blocks: Problems and Prospects for Europe’s 
Neutral and Nonaligned States (Washington, DC; Cambridge England: Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
52 Laurent F. Carrel, “Switzerland,” in The Missing Link: West European Neutrals and Regional 
Security, edited by Richard E. Bissell and Curt Gasteyger (Durham, NC; London: Duke University Press, 
1990). 
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describe the Austrian and Swiss models, emphasizing the small states’ security options 
and neutrality. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the political and military challenges that the 
Republic of Moldova has as an armed neutral state in the regional security architecture of 
the Black Sea Basin, by providing an analytical study on how small and neutral states like 
Austria and Finland ensure their national security, and can serve as models for Moldova’s 
case. The basic analytic approach is focused on security issues that shape the topic, 
focusing on different case studies and structured comparisons. 
For the purpose of cross-national comparison, an analytical framework will be 
employed to assess the security results made by the neutral states in ensuring their own 
security, and their contribution to regional and global security. The intended analytical 
approach argues that the armed neutrality of small states may result in ensuring their 
domestic, regional, and global security. This framework suggests that a variety of factors 
influence the national security in a certain country: geopolitical situation, frozen 
conflicts, ethnical problems, development of the country, and energy dependence.  
The study also will analyze the positive and negative consequences of the armed 
neutrality, concluding with an analysis of the lessons learned from other states that can 
benefit the Republic of Moldova. This thesis also will rely on such sources as the 
Congressional Research Service, Defense and Security Analysis, Strategic Studies 
Institute, Impact Strategic, Geostrategic Pulse, EU Security and Defense, and other 
occasional papers and reports that the author considers relevant to European security and 
to the Black Sea area. The primary sources for statistical data and government legislation 
53 Heinz Vetschera, “Austria,” in The Missing Link: West European Neutrals and Regional Security, 
edited by Richard E. Bissell and Curt Gasteyger, (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 1990). 
54 David S. Brackett, International Relations à La Carte: A New Swiss Neutrality in Europe, 
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, WCFIA Working Paper 4 (1997), 
http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/.  
55 Philip Windsor, “Neutral States in Historical Perspective,” in Between the Blocs, edited by Kruzel 
and Haltzel (New York: Cambridge University Press 1989). 
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will be the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, other 
international organizations, and the official websites of the Republic of Moldova.56 
Generally the main resources for this research will be the official documents 
posted by the Republic of Moldova government,57 European Union,58 and the cases 
studied and analyzed (Austria and Finland). Additionally, the Republic of Moldova 
National Security Strategy59 and other important national papers will provide valuable 
material for this study. Through analyzing and comparing models proposed, the author 
will arrive at the determination of Moldova’s role in the security architecture of the Black 
Sea Basin. 
Lastly, there are not many studies on this subject that would include the Republic 
of Moldova and its role in the Back Sea Basin. The topic was analyzed by some 
Romanian authors—notably from the European Institute of Romania,60 which provides a 
multilateral assessment of the Black Sea Basin. Also, Russian authors Grinevetskiy, 
Zonn, and Jhilzov, in The Black Sea Knot61 book, explain the geopolitical interest of the 
Black Sea countries and highlights the role that security resources play in this region. 
56 World Bank, “Republic of Moldova,” 
http://search.worldbank.org/all?qterm=Moldova&title=&filetype=; European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), “Republic of Moldova,” http://www.ebrd.com/search/query.html?qt= 
moldova&submit=; International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Republic of Moldova,” 
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/search.aspx?NewQuery=moldova&submit.x=0&submit.y=0; North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “Republic of Moldova,” http://www.nato.int/; Government of 
Republic of Moldova, http://www.gov.md/homepage.php?l=en; Ministry of Defense of Republic of 
Moldova, http://www.army.md/?lng=3; International Statistical Institute (ISI), “Republic of Moldova,” 
http://www.isi-web.org/; European Union (EU), “Republic of Moldova,” 
http://europa.eu/geninfo/query/resultaction.jsp?ResultCount=10&ResultMaxDocs=200&DefaultLG=en&pa
ge=1&SMODE=2&Collection=EuropaFull&Collection=EuropaSL&Collection=EuropaPR&qtype=simple
&ResultTemplate=%2Fresult_en.jsp&QueryText=moldova&y=0&x=0; World Health Organization Europe 
(WHO), http://www.euro.who.int/en/publications/search/a-z-list-of-all-publications. 
57 Republic of Moldova Government, Moldova Governement, http://www.gov.md/. 
58 European Union, “European Law and Treaties,” Europe, http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/index_en.htm.  
59 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, “Decision no. 153 of the Parliament of 
Republic of Moldova on July 15, 2011,” Moldova Parlament. (this translation by the author). 
60 Adrian Pop, and Dan Manoleli, Towards a European Strategy in the Black Sea Basin, Territorial 
Cooperation, European Institute of Romania (Bucharest: European Institute of Romania, December 2007).  
61 Grinevetskiy, Sergei R., Sergei S. Jhilzov and Igori S. Zonn, The Black Sea Knot (Moscow: 
Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya Publishers, 2007). 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis identifies the political and military challenges of the Republic of 
Moldova as an armed neutral in the regional security architecture of the Black Sea Basin. 
The thesis consists of four major chapters. Following this introductory chapter, which 
contains the research question, importance, and literature review, Chapter II provides an 
overview of political and military situation in the Black Sea Basin. Chapter III explains 
the Republic of Moldova National Security Strategy, resulting from its geopolitical 
positioning and existing frozen conflicts. Chapter IV promotes the armed neutrality 
concept for Moldova, adopted by European states. The chapter also includes some 
conceptual clarifications and a framework for analysis and comparative analysis of 
Austria and Finland, paying attention to the government policies that have implemented 
the neutrality and the underlying motivations of those policies. 
Although a preliminary look at the data shows that the neutral countries in Europe 
have followed different paths to ensure their security, an attempt will be made to identify 
commonalities for the benefit of providing a deeper understanding of the situation in 
Moldova. 
 16 
II. POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION IN THE BLACK SEA 
BASIN 
The new security configuration in the Black Sea Basin, which emerged after the 
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, highlights the increasing economic, political, and 
military importance of this strategic transportation corridor that links the energy 
resources of Eurasia with Europe. “An area of competition between Turkey and Russia 
and the source of bloody wars for hundreds of years,”62 as well as part of the Soviet 
sphere of influence during the Cold War, the Black Sea region is vital to a vast array of 
regional and international actors, including NATO, the European Union, and the United 
States.63 The Black Sea region obliges the regional and international actors to cooperate 
and pay a closer attention in securing the energy pipeline routes and asymmetrical threats, 
thus contributing to the regional and international security.64 
This chapter analyzes the political-military situation in the Black Sea Basin and 
the strategic significance of this area for the regional and international actors. The states 
with direct access to the Black Sea, as Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Georgia directly influence the economic, politic and security processes in the area. The 
riparian countries—Republic of Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Greece—shape the 
Wider Black Sea region and have their specific role in the region.  
On the one hand, the region seems rife with contrasts and conflict. Overall, the 
changes in the international system since the collapse of Soviet Union have placed the 
Black Sea states in continuous political, economic, and security struggles. The region’s 
ethnic, social, and religious diversity (Orthodoxy and Islam predominate), sometimes 
freely and sometimes more tensely, contributes in this regard. Also, the Black Sea Basin 
is the home to NATO states, neutral states, and Russian satellites, all strung like pearls 
62 Fatih Ozbay, “Discussions about Violations of the Montreux Convention and the Future of Turkish-




64 Romanian’s Permanent Delegation to NATO, “Black Sea,” Romania in NATO, 
http://nato.mae.ro/node/178. 
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along the region’s vital pipelines and trade routes. There are tensions amid these 
differences, some of which could easily spill out beyond the region; nonetheless, on the 
other hand, the points of contact and connection among the various players make the 
Black Sea region more than just an expedient label.  
A. BLACK SEA REGION AND REGIONAL SECURITY 
Amid the process of redefining Europe and transforming NATO, the Black Sea 
region also represents a challenge for the West. The aim is to reshape the region for the 
purposes of securing and anchoring democratic ideals and values, thus strengthening 
peace and stability in the region. Recent changes in the security environment in the 
Balkans, South Caucasus, and the former Soviet states also affect the evolution of 
security in the Black Sea region. The Wider Black Sea Basin has major strategic 
significance for the European Union and Euro-Atlantic community as a whole. The 
European Parliament, in its strategy resolution for the Black Sea area, “recalls that the 
Black Sea region is of geo-strategic importance for the energy security of the EU.”65 
Also, the strategic vector of the Black Sea with the Caspian Sea raises an increased 
interest of the main players in the region. In contrast to these concerns, the Russian 
Federation is trying to use this region to restore its former politico-military and economic 
bloc and to regain its position as hegemon.66 
1. Geography and Political Boundaries 
The Black Sea is part of the so-called Pontic Basin, located between Europe and 
Asia, connecting to the Azov Sea by the Cherci Strait; to the Marmara Sea through the 
Bosporus; and to the Aegean and Mediterranean Sea through the Dardanelles Strait.67 
Within the Wider Black Sea Basin, the Republic of Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and 
Greece are the riparian states, which shape the wider Black Sea region. However, the 
65 European Parliament, “Resolution of January 20, 2011 on an EU Strategy for the Black Sea 
(2010/2087(INI),” European Parliament Text Adopted, January 20, 2011 – Strasbourg, Black Sea News, 
http://www.blackseanews.net/en/read/48717. 
66 Marek Menkiszak, “The Putin Doctrine: The Formation of a Conceptual Framework for Russian 
Dominance in the Post-Soviet Area,” OSW Commentary, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-
commentary/2014-03-27/putin-doctrine-formation-a-conceptual-framework-russian. 
67 Pontica, “Black Sea,” Black Sea Basin Map, http://ecomareaneagra.wordpress.com/marea-neagra/. 
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term “Wider Black Sea Region” refers more to a political and economic region than a 
geographical one.  
Considered a gateway of oil and gas transit from Central Asia and the Caucasus to 
Europe, the Black Sea became a direct neighbor of the European Union once Romania 
and Bulgaria became members in 2007.68 Viewed as a “strategic bridge connecting 
Europe with the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, and the Middle East,”69 the Black Sea Basin, 
which also links Southeast Asia and China (Silk Road),70 is abundant in natural resources 
and has great economic potential, although political rivalries in the region threaten 
regional stability.71 The main actors in the Black Sea Basin, which encompasses some 
834,719 square kilometers and a population of 74.2 million, are Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Romania, Greece, Bulgaria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia. Four of these 
countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, and Georgia) are territorially situated entirely 
in the Black Sea Basin, while only sections of Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, 
Bulgaria, and Greece intersect with the Black Sea region. Furthermore, of all the Black 
Sea countries, six have direct access to the Black Sea—Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia. Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are landlocked 
states that maintain close economic, social, and historical ties with the Black Sea Basin.72 
The map in Figure 2 shows the broader Black Sea region, including states with trade or 
security connections to the region. 
68 Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Black Sea Region,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.mae.ro/node/1431. 
69 Central Intelligence Agency, “Republic of Moldova,” The World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/md.html. 
70 Teimuraz Gorshkov and George Bagaturia, “TRACECA—Restoration of Silk Route,” Central 
Asian Railway and Europe—Asian Land Bridge, Japan Railway and Transportation Review 28, September 
2001, http://www.jrtr.net/jrtr28/pdf/f50_gor.pdf. 
71 Central Intelligence Agency, “Republic of Moldova,” World Factbook. 
72 European Moldova, “Joint Operational Cooperation Program in the Black Sea Basin 2007–2013,” 
European Union in Moldova, http://infoeuropa.md/programul-operational-comun-de-cooperare-in-
bazinului-marii-negre-2007-2013/. 
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Figure 2.  Black Sea Basin.73 
Inside of all these states (except Greece), the new geopolitical settlement created 
diverse armed conflicts with territorial disputes—in the Republic of Moldova 
(Transnistria), between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), and in Georgia 
between (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). There remain internal political and ethnic friction 
in Turkey and the difficult process of democratization in Romania and Bulgaria.74 The 
interstate rivalries are also an area issue, in which the irredentism and revanchist 
phenomenon, between the aforementioned countries, impacts the coherence of the 
political and economic unity of the region, shaping the Black Sea security architecture.75 
The region is politically, historically, and geographically divided. Today, 
three principal actors influence security policy options. Russia fears 
encirclement by the West, and thus works to counteract EU and U.S. 
73 Pontica, “Black Sea,” Black Sea Basin Map, http://ecomareaneagra.wordpress.com/marea-neagra/. 
74 Ionut Gaidau, “Black Sea Region - Geopolitical Space,” Cadran Politic, no.69 (December 2009). 
75 Mitat Çelikpala, “Security in the Black Sea Region Policy Report II,” Commission on the Black 
Sea, A project of the German Marshall Fund Bertelsmann Stiftung, http://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/bst/en/media/xcms_bst_dms_30921_30922_2.pdf. 
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influence in the region. It seeks to maintain its own role as the key 
regional actor, and to block externally driven energy projects or military 
alliances. It wants to prevent NATO enlargement, as well as to suppress 
fundamentalist movements.76 
2. Treaties, Agreements, and Alliances 
The current situation in Ukraine reveals the volatility of NATO/EU expansion 
into the region.77 As part of its expansion eastward, NATO and the European Union have 
promoted cooperation in the Black Sea Basin that has led to short-term gains in regional 
stability. Romania and Bulgaria joined NATO in 2004. Although Turkey has been a 
leading member of NATO since 1952, it is still in the process of accession to the 
European Union. Whereas the question of joining NATO and the European Union has 
been politically divisive in Ukraine, citizens of Georgia have been more unified in their 
nation’s efforts to integrate into Western Europe and NATO.78 Azerbaijan and Armenia, 
driven by economic considerations, also are interested in deepening relations with the 
European Union.79 Likewise, with strong political will to align with Western powers, 
Moldova signed an association agreement with the European Union in June 2014; 
however, the Republic of Moldova is also concerned with maintaining its posture as a 
neutral in the Black Sea Basin.80 
However, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which includes 16 ENP 
countries, also has an action plan, alternately called the Association Agendas for Eastern 
partner countries. It is a platform for the European Union to engage “with its southern 
and eastern neighbors to achieve the closest possible political association and the greatest 
possible degree of economic integration. This goal builds on common interests and on 
76 Çelikpala, “Security in the Black Sea Region Policy Report II,” 5. 
77 Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, “Ukraine, NATO Enlargement, and the Geithner Doctrine,” 
Brookings, June 10, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2014/06/10-ukraine-nato-geithner-
doctrine-gaddy-ickes. 
78 Government of Georgia, “Prime Minister Met NATO Secretary General,” Prime Minister’s Press 
Service, http://government.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=387&info_id=40531. 
79 Fariz Ismailzade, “Azerbaijan and Europe: Toward Closer Integration?,” Diplomatic Traffic Debate 
Archives, http://www.diplomatictraffic.com/debate_archives.asp?ID=601. 
80 Council of the European Union, “EU - Republic of Moldova Cooperation Council Sixteenth 
Meeting - Brussels, June 26, 2014, Council of Europe, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/143407.pdf. 
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values—democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and social cohesion.”81 
Also, another EU project, launched in 2008 in Kiev, is designed to increase regional 
progress of South-East Europe and the Black Sea Synergy. This program allows the 
European Union to create new regional agenda for neighboring countries in the Black Sea 
spot, and provide civil assistance in the region referring to environment issues, energy, 
and transportation.82 
The 2014 Wales NATO summit recognized the importance of the Black Sea 
region, specifying its vital role in Euro-Atlantic security. Also, NATO came with a 
security initiative to support regional projects, increasing security in the area, and 
promoting cooperation between Black Sea Basin states.83  
For NATO, the Black Sea region has become the new front line in the fight 
against trafficking in arms, drugs, humans, and terrorism.84 In this context, various 
regional cooperation organizations and structures took shape that aim to monitor risks 
and threats. The main three are the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC),85 Naval 
Cooperation Task Force in the Black Sea (BLACKSEAFOR),86 and the Black Sea 
81 European Union External Actions, “European Neighborhood Policy (ENP),” European Union, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/blacksea/index_en.htm. 
82 European Union External Actions, “Black Sea Synergy,” European Union, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/blacksea/index_en.htm. 
83 NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in 
the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales Article 18,” Press Release (2014) 120, September 5, 
2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
84 Çelikpala, “Security in the Black Sea Region Policy Report II,” 5. 
85 Black Sea Economic Cooperation is multilateral economic and political cooperation, signed in 1992 
between eleven states from the Wider Black Sea Region, with the tasks of insuring stability and security in 
the Black Sea Region. The states are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, 
Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.  
86 The Naval Cooperation Task Force in the Black Sea - BLACKSEAFOR is a regional project, 
launched by Turkey, between Black Sea neighbor countries (Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, 
and Georgia). The organization mission is to increase cooperation and interoperability between their naval 
forces, based on friendship and mutual understanding. In 2001, in Istanbul = BLACKSEAFOR was signed 
by officials of all six member countries, with Turkey being the depository of this agreement. The 
agreement stipulates that BLACKSEAFOR tasks will have only a non-military character. 
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Harmony (OBSH).87 However, in addition to all these Black Sea Forum initiatives, there 
are also the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), European 
Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and European Neighborhood Policy 
(ENP), which through political, economic, and military cooperation and joint effort 
contribute to maintain security in the Black Sea region.88 
3. Security Threats 
Although maintaining social harmony among various religious and ethnic groups 
remains a serious concern, the biggest security considerations involve preserving 
territorial integrity, developing economic capacity, and securing energy supplies. Other 
issues include human trafficking, as well as the trade in drugs and arms, cross-border 
crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.89 These factors discourage 
international investment in these countries and imperil the economy, thus creating 
instability in the Black Sea Basin.90 
The region’s “frozen conflicts,” notably in Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 
remain the main danger for Black Sea security. These conflicts in the Black Sea Basin 
could escalate at any time. They have their origins in the Soviet period. Stalin resettled 
ethnic groups and redefined borders as a way of controlling minority populations within 
the Soviet Union, and underlying and unsettled conflicts among the various ethnic or 
ideological groups have re-emerged in the region. These conflicts differ in scale, form, 
and duration, but in general they share identical aims. Figure 3 highlights these regions 
that have conflicts in their territory. 
87 The Black Sea Harmony operation is a national Turkish project; its main tasks are the fight against 
terrorism and organized crime in the Black Sea. In the beginning the Turkish Navy conducted various 
operations to achieve its security objectives in the Black Sea; joining this initiative later were other 
countries from the region, giving this operation a multinational character of maintaining security in the 
Black Sea. 
88 Alexandros Petersen, “Black Sea Security: The NATO Imperative,” Global Europe Program, 
Wilson Center, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/black-sea-security-the-nato-imperative. 
89 Kempe and Klotzle, “The Balkans and the Black Sea Region: Problems, Potentials, and Policy 
Options,” 6.  
90 Ibid., 9. 
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Figure 3.  Conflicts in the Black Sea Region.91 
For example, relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan remain affected by the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which is still an unsettled ethnic dispute. Since 2008, 
Georgia has lost control of approximately 18 percent of its national territory, and today 
continues an active confrontation with the secessionist actions in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. The Russian Federation remains engaged in the Chechnya conflict, and the North 
Caucasus is still a hotbed for separatist movements. Moldova’s territorial integrity 
problems are exacerbated by separatists in Tiraspol,92 Transnistria, who control a small 
territory that they use, however, as an extremely significant corridor of organized crime, 
human trafficking, drugs and arms trafficking, cross-border crime, and the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction.93  
91 Çelikpala, “Security in the Black Sea Region Policy Report II,” Figure 1. 
92 Tiraspol is the second largest city by size in the Republic of Moldova. Currently, it is the capital of 
the separatist region of Moldova, unrecognized Transnistria.  
93 Lina Vdovîi, Mircea Opriș, and Adrian Mogoș, “Transnistria - Europe’s Hub of Smuggling and 
Trafficking,” Journalistic Investigation Center (Romanian Version), 
http://www.investigatii.md/eng/index.php?art=221.  
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Such separatist forces have become increasingly active amid these unsettled 
“frozen conflicts.” The informal meetings that bring together the unrecognized republics 
of Transnistria, Abkhazia, Karabakh and South Ossetia serve as a real threat and 
destabilization factor in the region. The leaders of these “quasi-state” entities have 
regular “official mutual visits,” where they promise each other political and military 
support, sign economic agreements, and manufacture and smuggle weapons in the 
conflict areas.94 The recent Russian-Ukrainian conflict amply demonstrates the 
transnational threats in the Black Sea Basin.95 
4. Economic and Energy Interests  
The discovery of oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia has turned the Black Sea 
Basin into a strategic transportation corridor connecting Europe, Central Asia, the 
southeastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East. The important geographic zone also is 
especially relevant to the riparian countries and other powers, such as the United States, 
Russia, and the European Union.96 With various security threats in the Middle East, and 
increased demand for energy from India and China, as well as the Russian energy 
dependence of Europe, the Euro-Atlantic community is essentially concerned about 
diversifying its energy supply. In this framework, the Black Sea Basin is projected to 
represent a pivotal transportation energy path97 from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to 
Western markets; see Figure 4.98 
94 Miles Atkinson and Fleur De Weerd, “Transnistria: A Country That Doesn’t Exist, But Has the 
Guns to Make You Think Otherwise,” The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/miles-
atkinson-fleur-de-weerd/transnistria-a-country-that-doesnt-exist_b_2421694.html. 
95 Mykola Kapitonenko, “Resolving Post-Soviet ‘Frozen Conflicts’: Is Regional Integration Helpful?” 
Caucasian Review of International Affairs, http://www.cria-online.org/6_4.html. 
96 Stamate Marius Gerald, “Geopolitical, Geoeconomical and Geostrategical Tendencies in the Black 





97 Roddy Thomson, “European Leaders Launched a Trillion-Euro Bid to Slash Dependency on Middle 
East Oil and Russian Gas, Clearing the Way to Place Nuclear Power at the Center of 21st Century Needs,” 




                                                 
 
Figure 4.  Principal European gas pipelines.99 
The economic and energy dimension in the Black Sea Basin also is a source of 
economic competition between different states in the region, at times escalating into 
diplomatic and armed crises.100 These energy crises have involved Russia-Belarus in 
2004, Russia-Ukraine in 2006, Russia-Moldova in 2006, Russia-Belarus in 2007, Russia-
Ukraine in 2009, and Russia-Belarus in 2010, highlighting the importance of energy for 
the security in this area. Particularly, the 2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis illustrated the 
importance of the Russian gas route, which transits the Confederation of Independent 
States (Western CIS) and reveals the EU energy dependence on the Russian 
Federation.101 
The transit routes (to a large extent crossing through the Black Sea countries) play 
a significant role in the security architecture of this region and the European continent as 
a whole. Also, natural gas is the main source of energy for the European countries.102 
99 Economist, “America and Russia: Pipedreams,” The Economist, 
http://www.economist.com/node/10566657. 
100 Gaidau, “Black Sea Region - Geopolitical Space.” 
101 Katja Yafimava, The Transit Dimension of EU Energy Security: Russian Gas Transit Across 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 2.  
102 Ibid., 3. 
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The new energy strategy of the European Union is based on reducing pollution, 
protecting the environment, and stabilizing the cost of energy for the future. 
Europe is becoming increasingly dependent on imported hydrocarbons. 
With “business as usual” the EU’s energy import dependence will jump 
from 50 percent of total EU energy consumption today to 65 percent in 
2030. Reliance on imports of gas is expected to increase from 57 percent 
to 84 percent by 2030, of oil from 82 percent to 93 percent.103  
The EU energy security objectives for the future are “promoting nonproliferation, 
as well as nuclear safety and security, in particular through a reinforced cooperation with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency and through the new Instrument for Nuclear 
Safety Cooperation.”104 To achieve these objectives, the European Union has been 
promoting increased collaboration and communication with the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), using 
investment programs to finance energy projects such as the “Trans-Caspian energy 
corridor or the Sub Saharan–Maghreb–EU.”105 The two projects currently in 
development are competing to supply Europe’s energy needs. The EU’s priority is the 
Nabucco gas pipeline, which connects the Caspian Basin to Austria and Hungary. 
Secondarily, the Russian-supported South Stream pipeline is planned to transport energy 
to Europe from Central Asia and North Africa.106 
The Russian Federation, which is the main producer of oil and gas in the area (and 
in the world)107 as well as the major gas provider to Europe,108 has particular interest in 
the energy game in the Black Sea. Approximately 25 percent of EU gas is provided by 
103 EUR-Lex, An Energy Policy for Europe, Access to European Union Law, Communication from 
the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament - {SEC(2007) 12} /* 





107 Christopher Helman, “The World’s Biggest Oil Companies,” Forbes, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2012/07/16/the-worlds-25-biggest-oil-companies/. 
108 Günther H. Oettinger, European Energy Security Strategy: Key Priorities and Actions, European 
Commission - SPEECH/14/505 - 25/06/2014, College of Europe and European Commission: First Joint 
High-Level Roundtable on EU Energy Policy, Brussels, June 25, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-14-505_en.htm. 
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Russia (Figure 5). For Moscow, the “Gazprom109 weapon” is a political and economic 
tool used to keep pressure on the European Union and other riparian countries (e.g., 
Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, and Ukraine). To ensure energy security, EU 
countries have been developing multiple import options. However, the older members of 
the European community are more developed and diverse in energy supply options, while 
the newest members, lacking infrastructure and energy options, are more dependent on 
Russian gas.110  
 
Figure 5.  European gas supplied by Russian Federation.111 
All of Europe is not equally reliant on Russian gas. Austria, Turkey, Greece, 
Poland, and Hungary import more than 50 percent of their gas from Russia, while 
Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia are entirely dependent on Russian gas. Notably, 
Croatia, Spain, and Sweden are among the countries that do not depend on Russian 
109 Gazprom, a Russian energy company founded in 1989, is the largest natural gas producer in the 
world. The Russian government controls Gazprom entirely. Gazprom is headquartered in Moscow, Russia, 
and Alexei Miller is the director executive of the company.  
110 Yafimava, The Transit Dimension of EU Energy Security: Russian Gas Transit Across Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Moldova, 73‒74. 
111 Economist, “Reducing Europe’s Dependence on Russian Gas is Possible—But it will Take Time, 




                                                 
gas.112 Therefore, concomitant with increasing energy demand and dependence on 
Russian resources, the importance of transit routes has risen significantly. Until reaching 
the final consumer in Europe, the energy resources cross several non-EU states (Figure 
6). However, there is no watchdog authority to regulate arising conflicts in these transit 
countries, which is a major source of regional instability.113  
 
Figure 6.  Western Russian pipelines transporting gas to Europe through 
CIS.114 
The security environment in the Black Sea Basin, as well as for the European 
Union, depends significantly on future energy security alternatives, diversifying the 
energy market, and reducing the Russian gas dependence. The United States supports the 
112 Yafimava, The Transit Dimension of EU Energy Security: Russian Gas Transit Across Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Moldova, 73‒76. 
113 Ibid., 79‒80. 
114 Yafimava, The Transit Dimension of EU Energy Security: Russian Gas Transit Across Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Moldova, Map 4.1: Transit Pipelines Bringing Russian Gas to Europe across the Western CIS, 
77, (original source: A. Honore, European Natural Gas Demand, Supply, and Pricing, OIES/OUP, 2010, 
139. (amended)). 
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EU’s Nabucco-West pipeline project (Figure 7) through Baku (Azerbaijan) as an 
alternative to Russian gas dependence.115  
 
Figure 7.  Proposed Nabucco gas pipeline.116 
Similarly, the Russian Federation is promoting the South Stream pipeline (Figure 
8),117 which Russia anticipates will carry more resources to Europe using the Caucasus 
and Russian sources, and passing the offshore Black Sea portions, avoiding different 
states’ territorial waters.118 
115 Vladimir Socor, “Nabucco-West Project, European Commission Face Same Moment of Truth in 
Baku,” The Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor 10, no. 102 (May 30, 2013), 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40957&no_cache=1#.U8qpM_mSzCI. 
116 European Dialogue, “Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor: The Great Pipeline Race,” European 
Energy Security and Related Issues, http://eurodialogue.org/Nabucco-Map. 
117 South Stream, “About South Stream,” http://www.south-stream.info/en/pipeline/significance/; The 
South Stream Pipeline is a Russian Federation initiative in EU energy security, which consists of building 
gas supplies and avoiding the transit risks. The aim of the South Stream project is providing the EU with 
additional natural gas, which is considered secure and better for the environment than fossil fuel. Also, the 
South Stream project is the main plan for gas supply routes to the EU.  
118 European Dialogue, “Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor: The Great Pipeline Race.” 
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Figure 8.  Proposed South Stream pipeline on the map of Europe.119 
Regardless of any political and economic interests, regional security depends on 
the ability of all Black Sea states and willingness of energy transit countries to cooperate. 
B. THE ROLE OF NATIONAL ACTORS IN POLITICS, 
ECONOMICS, AND SECURITY 
Before the Soviet Union collapsed, NATO and the Warsaw Pact120 were the two 
main powers in the Black Sea region. However, since the end of the Cold War, numerous 
regional actors have emerged in the area. Today, all of the countries in the Black Sea 
Basin are struggling to solve political, economic, and security problems. To better 
understand the security architecture in the Black Sea Basin and its regional problems, a 
multilateral analysis of the regional and international players is necessary. 
119 European Dialogue, “Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor: The Great Pipeline Race,” European 
Energy Security and Related Issues: South Stream on the Map of Europe, http://eurodialogue.org/South-
Stream-on-the-map-of-Europe. 
120 The Warsaw Pact was initiated by Nikita Khrushchev in 1955 and was signed in Warsaw on May 
14, 1955. This pact was a military alliance of countries in Eastern Europe and the Eastern Bloc, who 
wanted to defend against the NATO alliance. The Warsaw Pact stopped operating on March 3, 1991, and 
was officially dissolved at a meeting in Prague on July 1, 1991. 
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1. Russian Federation 
Facing a deep crisis in the last decade as a result of losing super-power status, 
today Russia is strengthening its political, economic, and military efforts to consolidate 
the Russian state, strengthen CIS, and re-establish control over the former Soviet 
republics (seen as a resuscitation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, USSR).121 
Recent events in Ukraine, as well as the union of Crimea with the Russian Federation, 
have reshaped the geographical borders of Russia and significantly increased its influence 
and military presence in the Black Sea Basin. Accordingly, the Russian Federation now 
officially controls a larger segment of the Black Sea, which consists of the full littoral of 
the Crimean peninsula and the Kerch Straits, near main oil and gas routes linking the 
Black and Caspian seas.122 As a result of the March 2014 treaty between Russia and 
Crimea, the Russian Federation extended its jurisdiction over the Black Sea and the Sea 
of Azov (Donetsk region); the agreement also gave autonomous status to Russia’s naval 
fleet in Sevastopol, which until then was part of the group of forces in the Black Sea.123 
Thus, Russia has extended its influence over the Black Sea Basin and other important 
water routes (Black Sea-Sea of Azov-Don-Volga Don Canal-Volga-Caspian Sea).124  
With NATO’s eastward expansion and the accession of Balkan countries to Euro-
Atlantic structures, Russia began to worry about the proximity of North Atlantic 
organizations to its border. Of particular concern has been NATO’s newly acquired direct 
access to the Black Sea via Romania and Bulgaria.125 Thus, to preserve its influence over 
121 Arseni Iațeniuk, “Arseniy Iateniuk ‘Resuscitation of USSR’ Could Be the Biggest Disaster of this 
Century,” Radio Free Europe, April 4, 2014, 
http://www.europalibera.org/archive/news/20140404/445/445.html?id=25321231. 
122 Michel Chossudovsky, “Crisis in Ukraine: Russia Extends its Control over the Black Sea and 
Strategic Waterways,” Global Research, March 18, 2014, http://www.globalresearch.ca/russia-extends-its-
control-over-the-black-sea-and-strategic-waterways/5374021. 
123 President of Russia, “Agreement on the Accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian 
Federation Signed,” Kremlin.ru, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6890. 
124 Chossudovsky, “Crisis in Ukraine: Russia Extends its Control over the Black Sea and Strategic 
Waterways.” 
125 Ziare Magazine, “Lavrov: NATO’s Eastward Expansion is Counterproductive,” Ziare.com, 
http://www.ziare.com/international/rusia/lavrov-extinderea-nato-catre-est-este-contraproductiva-1303538. 
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the former Soviet area, the Russian Federation has turned to using its economic leverage 
and sometimes even military force.126  
Despite extensive efforts made by the Russian Federation to improve its 
multilateral relations with the European Union127 and NATO,128 the current crises in 
Ukraine (including the recent shooting down of a commercial jetliner in the Donetsk 
region and the disputes over Crimea) significantly jeopardize their relations. 
Nevertheless, to strengthen its position as a core actor in the Black Sea Basin and 
throughout Europe, and to regain world super-power status, the Russian Federation 
continues to use the energy dependence in relations with the European Union, and frozen 
conflicts, and the motive of protecting the Russian-speaking population all over the 
former Soviet sphere.129  
2. Turkey 
Linking Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East, Turkey is 
strategically located and plays a significant military and economic role in the Black Sea 
region.130 Before its defeat in World War I, the Ottoman Empire, from which the modern 
Republic of Turkey emerged, conducted commerce and maintained relations throughout 
the region.131 During the Cold War, Turkey played a buffering role between NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact. Later, after the Soviet Union broke apart, Turkey began to consolidate 
126 Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, “Back in the USSR: Russia’s Intervention in the Internal Affairs of 
the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy Towards Russia,” Belfer Center 
for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2014/03/back-in-the-ussr-1994-hill-jewett. 
127 European Union External Actions, “EU relations with Russia,” EU Around the Globe, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/. 
128 NATO, “NATO’s Relations with Russia,” NATO International, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm?. 
129 TSG Intel Brief, “The Gas Bloc: Russia’s Sphere of Energy Influence,” TSG The Soufan Group, 
http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-gas-bloc-russias-sphere-of-energy-influence/. 
130 Central Intelligence Agency, “Turkey,” World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html. 
131 NZ History, “The Ottoman Empire Page 10 – Birth of the Turkish Republic,” NZhistory, 
http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/ottoman-empire/birth-of-turkey. 
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its position as a major player in the Black Sea Basin and strengthened its relationship 
with NATO.132  
Realizing its strategic importance and military power, Turkey started using the 
Black Sea Basin to achieve its economic goals through regional trade. It also sought to 
fortify its security with NATO. Toward these objectives, Turkey has contributed in the 
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), which was started in 
1999. However, because of various internal issues and the 2008 Georgia-Russian war, the 
project has been somewhat threatened by uncertainty and insecurity.133  
The Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRASEKA), with the purpose of 
linking Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus, is another Black Sea project that 
has significantly affected the Turkish economy, as well as European energy security.134 
Turkey’s central objective in the region remains to become the main access point 
connecting Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. This is one reason why Turkey 
voted for re-establishment of the Silk Road, which historically was very profitable.135 
However, since 1999, Turkey has been an EU candidate country and increasingly 
dependent on its partnerships with the European Union and the United States for regional 
security. Solidarity with the United States in the fight against international terrorism since 
2001 particularly has contributed to a favorable security environment in the region.136 
However, Turkey’s prodigious border with Syria is riddled with strife, which faces 
132 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkey’s Relations with NATO,” Turkey 
Foreign Policy, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/nato.en.mfa. 
133 Alexander Vasiliev, “The Black Sea Region in Turkish Foreign Policy Strategy: Russia & Turkey 
on the Black Sea,” Carnegie Moscow Center Report No. 2010/2: 2, Black Sea Peacebuilding Network 
Russian Expert Group, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Turkey_black_sea_report_eng.pdf. 
134 Giray Saynur Bozkurt, “Security Policy of Turkey and Russia in the Black sea Basin,” Karam.org, 
http://www.karam.org.tr/Makaleler/631151712_Giray%20Saynur%20Bozkurt.pdf. 
135 Ertugrul APAKAN, “Turkey’s Approach to the Black Sea Region and to the Organization of the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC),” Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-approach-to-the-black-sea-region-and-to-the-organization-of-the-black-
sea-economic-cooperation-_bsec_-.tr.mfa. 
136 United States Department of States, “U.S. Relations with Turkey,” Bureau of European and 
Eurasian Affairs, April 3, 2014 Fact Sheet, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm. 
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“regional violence and a growing influx of Syrian refugees.”137 Until now, Turkey also 
has maintained close economic relations with the Russian Federation, through their 
historic path and large marketplace in the region. Furthermore, the security of Turkey, as 
well as political-economic relations with its Black Sea partners, which is related to its 
domestic policy, must be analyzed in terms of the Islamic factor, which has a significant 
importance.138 
3. Ukraine 
Ukraine is one of the largest countries in continental Europe and plays a 
significant part in the security of the Black Sea Basin. With a strategic geographical 
position, connecting Europe with Asia, and a large Black Sea coastline, Ukraine’s role in 
regional security is central.139 Externally, Ukraine has good and constructive relations 
with the European Union, endeavoring to achieve economic integration and political 
association. The country’s relationship with NATO has been amplified because of the 
recent conflict with Russia. Moreover, Ukraine has been an Organization for Democracy 
and Economic Development (regional initiative between Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, 
and Moldova, GUAM) member from the beginning of this project in 2001. Also, since 
1998, Ukraine has been a major associate in the Eastern Partnership, which is an ENP 
component. In March 2014, Ukraine signed a free trade agreement with the European 
Union.140 
Internally, Ukraine faces many ethnic, religious, political, economic, sovereignty, 
and territorial-integrity problems. With the outbreak of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict in 
the beginning of 2014, the security architecture in the Black Sea Basin has deteriorated 
considerably. The Russian Federation is using its political and economic leverage to keep 
137 James A. Baker III, “Trouble at the Border: Turkey’s Syria Policy is Under Fire,” Baker Institute 
Blog, http://blog.chron.com/bakerblog/2014/07/trouble-at-the-border-turkeys-syria-policy-is-under-fire/. 
138 Vasiliev, “The Black Sea Region in Turkish Foreign Policy Strategy: Russia & Turkey on the 
Black Sea,” 4–5. 
139 Central Intelligence Agency, “Ukraine,” World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html. 
140 European Union External Actions, “The EU’s Relations with Ukraine,” EU Around the Globe, 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/. 
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Ukraine under its influence. In the context of losing the Crimean region, Ukraine also lost 
an important part of the Black Sea littoral, and diminished Ukraine’s access to the Black 
Sea while it provided a warm-water port for the Russian Federation.141 
Still, Ukraine remains strategically located along the main transit route for 
Russian gas and oil, which supplies energy to Europe. This position has economically 
benefited Ukraine (with reduced prices for gas and oil) and politically (with close 
relations with the Russian Federation). On the other hand, the country’s status as a transit 
region also has brought Ukraine numerous problems (e.g., Russia-Ukraine oil crisis of 
2006 and 2009, as well as recent military conflicts that threatened Ukrainian sovereignty 
and territorial integrity). Thus, the United States and the European Union are interested in 
increasing Ukraine’s role and cooperation in the important energy corridor of the Black 
and Caspian seas; this intention is not favorable for the Russian Federation and puts 
Ukraine in the viewfinder of the great powers.142 
4. Romania 
Located on the coast between Bulgaria and Ukraine in Southeastern Europe, with 
direct access to the Black Sea, Romania is one of the main players in the Black Sea 
Basin.143 As a member of NATO and the European Union, the country actively 
participates in numerous Black Sea security and cooperation programs. Its role is 
significant in the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), 
Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre (SELEC), South-East Europe Cooperation 
Process (SEECP), Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), Regional 
Cooperation Council (RCC), BLACKSEAFOR, and Black Sea Harmony. Also, Romania 
tries largely to be involved in EU projects in the Black Sea region, such as the Black Sea 
141 Ioana Tudor, “Losing Crimea, Prevent Ukraine to Become Energy Independent and then a Threat 




142 Barry R. Posen, “Ukraine: Part of America’s ‘Vital Interests’?,” The National Interest, 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/ukraine-part-americas-vital-interests-10443. 
143 Central Intelligence Agency, “Romania,” World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ro.html. 
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Synergy project, Black Sea Fund, and BSEC improvements. Romania specified its role in 
the Black Sea Basin in its white paper on National Security and Defense.144  
Romania’s unique position at the junction of the Black and the Mediterranean 
seas, known as the “southern flank of NATO,”145 is strategically important for 
controlling key transit routes along the Danube River to and from central, southeastern, 
and Western Europe.146 In addition to opportunities for commerce and control, the 
country’s location also is a source of high-risk transboundary threats from the Caucasus, 
the Caspian, and Central Asia, prejudiced by frozen conflicts in the CIS (Moldova, 
Georgia), and the amplification of asymmetric threats, drug and human trafficking, 
migration, and terrorism.147 Romania’s role defining the expanding boundaries of NATO 
and the European Union contributes significantly to its national security and to the 
stability beyond its borders.148 
The geostrategic importance of the Black Sea Basin, brought to international 
attention by the recent Russian-Ukrainian conflict, is likely to increase Romania’s role in 
the Wider Black Sea region, especially in the context of the start of building a missile 
defense facility in October 2013 in Deveselu; this facility is the foundation of the NATO 
missile shield elements.149 Also, Romania’s unique position of controlling the Danube 
access routes, a key river transit path to and from central, southeastern, and Western 
144 Romania, Decision of the Supreme Council of National Defense: Defense White Paper No. 77 
(2013): 10‒11.  
145 Jim Garamone, “NATO Defense Chiefs to Discuss Russia, Afghanistan,” U.S. Department of 
Defense, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122290. 
146 Titus Corlăţean, “Romania Actively Participates in the Implementation of the EU Strategy for 
Central Asia,” Romania Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mae.ro/node/27777. 




149 NATO, “Newsroom,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news104549.htm?selectedLocale=en; 
Romania – United States bilateral agreement, which stipulates building the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 
system at Deveselu, Olt County. The system incorporates the missile defense radar and interceptors. This 
base will be a component of NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense system, operated and controlled by NATO 
and is planned to be operational in 2015.  
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Europe, increases its role.150 For Romania, maintaining both internal and regional 
security are required conditions for political and economic development.151  
5. Bulgaria 
Situated between Romania and Turkey in Southeastern Europe, Bulgaria’s 
strategic position next to the Turkish Straits controls key land routes connecting Europe 
to the Middle East and Asia.152 Bulgaria also is a member of NATO and the European 
Union. The military training facilities on Bulgarian territory—e.g., the Novo Selo 
polygon,153 Bezmer base,154 Graf Ignatievo airfield,155 and Logistics Center Aitos156—
highlight the country’s contribution to regional security.157  
Accordingly, Bulgaria is one of the leading nations in the cooperation programs in 
the Black Sea Basin. Bulgaria has played a leading role in BSEC, since its founding in 
1992 as the main program in the Black Sea.158 Besides participating with the European 
Union in various regional security programs (e.g., OSCE, Black Sea Forum initiative, 
European Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), 
150 Corlăţean, “Romania Actively Participates in the Implementation of the EU Strategy for Central 
Asia.”  
151 Andreea Țilea and Marius Dincă, “European Strategy in the Black Sea,” Geopolitics.ro, 
http://geopolitics.ro/strategia-europeana-la-marea-neagra/. 
152 Central Intelligence Agency, “Bulgaria,” World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bu.html. 
153 Novo Selo Polygon is a joint Bulgarian - U.S military training facility, which trains NATO troops 
forces in the region and other countries that share common Euro-Atlantic principles and contribute to 
regional security. 
154 Bezmer Air Base is a U.S military facility in Bulgaria, located in the proximity of Yambol, and 
near to Bolyarsko. 
155 Graf Ignatievo Air Base is located in Graf Ignatievo, which is a region in Plovdiv. It is a military 
airport and currently the single fighter air base in Bulgaria, which is largely used by U.S. troops and NATO 
forces.  
156 The Logistic Center Aitos, situated closer to the town of Aitos, is a joint Bulgaria – U.S. military 
logistic facility, aimed to supply the Novo Selo polygon. 
157 Bulgaria Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Minister Vigenin Met with the Assistant Secretary General 
of NATO, Terry Stamatopoulos,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs News, 
http://www.mfa.bg/en/events/6/1/1377/index.html. 
158 Bulgaria Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The European Perspective and the Regional Cooperation are 
Important for the Future of South East Europe,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs News, 
http://www.mfa.bg/en/events/6/1/1403/index.html. 
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etc.), Bulgaria has an important tourist industry that contributes significantly to its 
economy.159  
In terms of energy security, the country operates both electrical and nuclear 
plants, and is crossed by a main transit route for transporting Russian natural gas to 
Europe. Although currently stalled because of the conflict in Ukraine, when completed, 
the planned Gazprom project “South Stream” will further contribute to Bulgaria’s 
leadership role in the Black Sea Basin.160 
6. Georgia 
Flanking the Black Sea, between Russia and Turkey, Georgia is located in 
Southwestern Asia. Parts of the country (e.g., its northern Caucasus) extend to the 
European continent. With 310 kilometers of coastline along the Black Sea, Georgia 
controls most of the Caucasus Mountains and the pathways through them.161  
To avoid energy dependence on the Russian Federation, Georgia in 2007 began 
importing gas from Azerbaijan, and today continues to import most of its natural gas 
from that country. Only 10 percent of its gas is provided by Russia at no cost due to 
Georgia’s role as a transit country for the Russian North-South Pipeline to Armenia.162 
After the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in 2008,163 the Russian Federation established 
several military bases in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. 
159 Marin Lessenski, “The Black Sea Cooperation: An Outlook from Bulgaria,” Xenophon Paper, No. 
2, 38‒50.  
160 Stanley Reed, “A Conduit for Russian Gas, Tangled in Europe’s Conflicts: South Stream Pipeline 
Project in Bulgaria is Delayed,” New York Times, July 1, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/business/international/south-stream-pipeline-project-in-bulgaria-is-
delayed.html?_r=1. 
161 Central Intelligence Agency, “Georgia,” World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html. 
162 Molly Corso, “Georgia: No Plans to Import More Russian Gas,” Natural Gas Europe, 
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/georgia-russian-gas-imports. 
163 The Russian Georgian conflict lasted for five days (August 7‒12, 2008), and was focused on South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia (two separatist regions officially part of Georgia and supported by the Russian 
Federation).  
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Currently, the Russian Federation still controls these separatists’ unrecognized 
regions.164  
Despite the existing conflict, which has become frozen, Georgia continues to 
develop a real market economy and integrate into Western institutions. The country’s 
main objective is joining NATO and the European Union.165 Since signing the 
association agreement with the European Union on June 27, 2014, Georgia joined the 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).166 Georgia also participates in 
GUAM, BSEC, and OSCE, through which the country contributes to regional security in 
the Black Sea Basin.167  
In terms of major security challenges, Georgia remains determined to restore its 
territorial sovereignty over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, the settlement of its 
“frozen conflict” largely depends on Georgian relations with the Russia Federation, 
which has supported the secessionist provinces and categorically opposes Georgia’s 
intentions to join NATO.168 Nevertheless, presence of a much larger neighbor and the 
existence of unsettled conflicts on its territory, as well as the recent crisis in Ukraine, may 
make alignment with the institutions of Western Europe the country’s best option for 
internal and regional security.169 
164 Luke Coffey, “Georgia and Russia: The Occupation Too Many Have Forgotten,” Daily Signal, 
May 31, 2012, http://dailysignal.com/2012/05/31/georgia-and-russia-the-occupation-too-many-have-
forgotten/. 
165 Office of the State Minister of Georgia on European &Euro-Atlantic Integration, “Georgia and EU, 
Georgia and NATO,” Georgian Government, http://www.eu-nato.gov.ge/en. 
166 The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) is an agreement between the EU and 
Georgia with preferential trade relationship, based on common advantageous treatment, giving mutual 
access to their markets than that offered to other trade partners. 
167 Office of the State Minister of Georgia on European &Euro-Atlantic Integration, “Georgia EU 
Cooperation,” Georgian Government, http://www.eu-nato.gov.ge/en/eu/cooperation. 
168 Georgia, “2013 Report,” The Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Reconciliation and Civic 
Equality, Georgian Government, http://www.smr.gov.ge/docs/doc290.pdf. 
169 Zaal Anjaparidze, “Georgia Needs NATO Now More Than Ever,” Moscow Times, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/georgia-needs-nato-now-more-than-ever/503774.html. 
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C. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN POLITICS, 
ECONOMICS, AND SECURITY 
The key international players in the Black Sea Basin are the United States, the 
European Union, NATO, and CIS. A number of other organizations also operate in the 
region, such as GUAM, SEECP, OSCE, BSEC, and RCC. All of these countries and 
organizations have their own political, economic, and security agendas. If some of them 
are trying to create a common security environment, promote democracy, and support 
their partners, others are watching for more convenient and effective economical 
alternatives to ensure their energy security. The common interest of all is to cooperate 
and establish regional stability and security.170 
1. United States 
The United States is one of the main international actors interested in establishing 
regional security and stability in the Black Sea Basin.171 Its foreign policy is focused on 
the energy resources in the Black and Caspian seas, and on the democratization of the 
post-Soviet countries in the region (Ukraine, Georgia, and Republic of Moldova). The 
2008 Russian-Georgian clash172 and the 2014 Ukrainian conflict173 have increased the 
role of the United States for providing regional stability, which also is important for 
ensuring security for Europe. The U.S. government also gives special attention to 
supporting regional cooperation, as well as fighting corruption, organized crime, and 
terrorism.174 
170 Eugen Lungu, “NATO Summit in Chicago and the New Dynamics of Military Security in the 
Black Sea Region,” Policy Sphere Global Security, http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/170/art15-Lungu.php. 
171 Mitat Celikpala, Commission on the Black Sea: Security in the Black Sea Region: Policy Report 
II,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, http://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/bst/en/media/xcms_bst_dms_30921_30922_2.pdf. 
172 BBC, “Russia-Georgia Conflict,” BBC News, January 19, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/europe/2008/georgia_russia_conflict/default.stm. 
173 BBC News, “Malaysian Jet Crashes in East Ukraine Conflict Zone,” BBC News, July17, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28354856. 
174 Dimitrios Triantaphyllo, The Security Context in the Black Sea Region (New York: Routledge, 
2010), 79‒80. 
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The role of the United States in the Black Sea began to expand after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989. Implementation of various security projects through NATO, 
Partnership for Peace (PfP), the European Union, and OSCE had a common goal of 
providing peace and stability in the region. The constructive evolution of the frozen 
conflicts and the efforts to identify a peaceful settlement and compromise are part of 
these projects.175 The U.S. position in the Black Sea concerning security is clear:  
From the U.S. point of view, NATO is and will remain the premier 
provider of security for the Euro-Atlantic region, which includes the Black 
Sea. Far from seeking to charge into the region, the U.S. approach is to 
work with its Allies and friends, and within the frameworks they find 
comfortable, to strengthen cooperation and collaboration on security. The 
U.S. is not seeking to establish a permanent naval presence in the Black 
Sea, but it is committed to engaging with its allies and friends to enhance 
security and cooperation throughout the region.176 
Moreover, energy issues in the region are a priority of the U.S. government. The 
United States promotes several options to secure Europe energy and expand the gas 
supply, avoiding Russian gas supremacy. One of these projects is the Nabucco 
pipeline.177 The Russian Federation promotes its own project, the South Stream pipeline, 
targeting approximately the same European states, which raises energy disputes on more 
than a regional level.178 In this context the Black Sea Basin has become a buffer zone 
between Russia and the European Union, where the United States is trying to implement 
its policy and promote its interests.179 
175 Ross Wilson, “U.S. Policy in the Black Sea Region,” Ambassador of the U.S. to Ankara Speech at 
the ARI Movement’s 9th Annual Security Conference Summer 2006, Turkish Policy Quarterly (Summer 
2006): 2‒3. http://www.turkishpolicy.com/article/660/us-policy-in-the-black-sea-region-summer-2006/. 
176 Ibid., 1. 
177 Triantaphyllo, The Security Context in the Black Sea Region, 80‒83. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Roberto D. Kaplan, “Europe’s New Map,” The American Interest, April 12, 2013, http://www.the-
american-interest.com/articles/2013/04/12/europes-new-map/. 
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2. European Union 
The European Union has direct access to the Black Sea with the accession of 
Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. Through implementing various security and energy 
projects, its strategic role in this region has increased significantly. These projects include 
Black Sea Synergy, BSEC, SELEC, SEECP, CEFTA, Security and Defense Policy 
(CSDP), BLACKSEAFOR, and Black Sea Harmony.180 
In the context of expansion eastward, the European Union is particularly 
concerned about regional stability in the Black Sea Basin benefiting energy-supply routes 
bypassing the Russian Federation.181 To promote regional stability, the European Union 
participates in various peacekeeping missions and is actively involved in solving area 
conflicts. Within the framework of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy, the 
European Union has supported military and civilian missions in the region, including 
EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia Herzegovina (2004)182 and EULEX in Kosovo (2008).183 
The European Union is testing its own capabilities to react and control outbreaks of 
conflict in Europe.184 The success of this strategy can be seen in the 2008 Russian-
Georgian conflict, where the European Union served as a firm mediator in drawing the 
six-point ceasefire agreement, establishing the EUMM185 Georgia mission.186 
180 European Union External Actions,” Black Sea Synergy,” Regional Policy, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/blacksea/index_en.htm. 
181 European Commission, “Sea Basin Strategy: Black Sea, Blue Growth Infographic,” Maritime 
Affairs, http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/blue_growth/infographics/#_Black_Sea. 
182 The EUFOR ALTHEA – European Union Force is a military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
started on December 2, 2004. Operation is led by the EU under CSDP, with the mission to provide 
capacity-building and training support for Bosnia and Herzegovina forces in maintaining a safe and secure 
environment. 
183 The EULEX - European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo is one of the largest civilian 
missions under CSDP. Launched in February 2008, the mission is to assist and support the Kosovo 
government in the law and judiciary field. 
184 Security and Defense CSDP, “Ongoing Missions and Operations,” European Union External 
Actions, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm. 
185 The EUMM stands for European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia. It is an autonomous 
mission, which started in September 2008, and is conducted by the EU under the EU Common Security and 
Defense Policy (CSDP). 
186 Georgia, “The Six-Point Ceasefire Agreement of August 12, 2008,” The Office of the State 
Minister of Georgia for Reconciliation and Civic Equality, http://www.smr.gov.ge/index.php?opt=11. 
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As a regional and global actor, the “EU promotes integration as a means to 
support peace and prosperity and to overcome conflicts around the world.”187 Its role in 
the region becomes more prominent and decisive as its community grows. The European 
Union also is one of the most active actors contributing to the security in the area, jointly 
with its friends, international organizations, and strategic partners.188 
3. NATO 
NATO plays both a political and military role in the Black Sea Basin—promoting 
“democracy, regional cooperation, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.”189  
If diplomatic efforts fail, it has the military capacity needed to undertake 
crisis-management operations. These are carried out under Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty—NATO’s founding treatyor under a UN mandate, 
alone or in cooperation with other countries and international 
organizations.190 
NATO has been involved in the Black Sea Basin since 1952, when Turkey joined 
the organization. The region has become more important to NATO since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and expanded access. States within the Black Sea Basin first started 
cooperating with NATO through the Partnership for Peace program (PfP)191 and various 
security projects focusing on the Black Sea Basin.192  
NATO’s interest in the Black Sea increased substantially following the September 
11, 2001, New York terrorist attacks. Taking into consideration that the threats originated 
from the Greater Middle East, in proximity of Europe, the Black Sea Basin found itself 
187 European Union External Actions, “Conflict Prevention, Peace Building and Mediation,” Conflict 
Prevention, http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/conflict_prevention/index_en.htm. 
188 Ibid. 
189 NATO, “What is NATO, the Political and Military Alliance,” NATO Welcome, 
http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html. 
190 Ibid. 
191 The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a practical bilateral cooperation program between the Euro-
Atlantic partner countries and NATO. It facilitates partners to strengthen their individual relationship with 
NATO, proposing their own objectives for cooperation. This program was launched in 1994, with the aim 
of increasing stability and security, as well as fight against various threats, jointly with Euro-Atlantic 
partners and partner countries. 
192 Volodymyr Dubovyk, “NATO’s Role in the Wider Black Sea Area,” PONARS Eurasia Policy 
Memo, no. 11 (2008): 1‒2. 
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within Western security policy. Now with three Black Sea Basin countries in its structure 
(Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria), as well as other regional partners (Russia, Ukraine, 
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Republic of Moldova),193 NATO has become one of 
the main security providers in the region.194  
Recognizing the importance of the Black Sea Basin in the 2004 Istanbul NATO 
summit195 and those that followed, NATO became a core regional actor in fighting 
against terrorism and the trafficking of arms, drugs, and humans.196 Several multiple 
security cooperation projects in the region have included the Naval Cooperation Task 
Force in the Black Sea (BLACKSEAFOR) and the Black Sea Harmony (OBSH).197  
With the recent conflict over Ukraine, and several frozen conflicts in the Black 
Sea Basin (e.g., Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia), NATO itself argues its 
mission fully. Its role in the region is central, despite the Franco-German reluctance to 
seeing an extensive development of NATO in the Black Sea Basin.198 One thing is 
certain: besides major players in the Black Sea Basin (Russian Federation, European 
Union), NATO comes as a powerful player set to ensure the security of its members and 
balance the power in the region. 
4. CIS 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—created in December 1991 by 
the Russian Federation, Belarus, and Ukraine (Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh 
Gosudarstv)—originally consisted of 12 former independent countries of the Soviet 
193 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), “NATO Member Countries and the Following Partner 
Countries,” NATO Organizations, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/51288.htm. 
194 Marat Terterov and George Niculescu, “The Evolution of European and Euro-Atlantic Policy 
Making in the Wider Black Sea: EU And NATO Attempts at Strengthening Regionalism in an Area of 
Strategic Interest,” European Geopolitical Forum, Brussels (2012): 10‒12. 
195 Romanian’s Permanent Delegation to NATO, “Black Sea,” Romania in NATO, 
http://nato.mae.ro/node/178. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Alexandros Petersen, “Black Sea Security: The NATO Imperative,” Global Europe Program, 
Wilson Center, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/black-sea-security-the-nato-imperative. 
198 George Vlad Niculescu, “Briefing on: ‘The Role of NATO in the Wider Black Sea,’ International 
Conference, “Regional Security Dynamics in the South Caucasus” (Yerevan, November 17‒18, 2011), 4, 
http://gpf-europe.com/upload/iblock/d06/george_yerevan_brief.pdf. 
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Union (i.e., Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Republic of Moldova). Other former 
Soviet states (including Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) refused to join the CIS, which is 
headquartered in Minsk, Belarus.199  
The mission of the CIS is to organize and coordinate foreign relations, defense, 
environmental protection, law enforcement, immigration, and economic policies among 
its members. The head of member states and their prime ministers create the CIS council 
assisted by resort ministries.200 Despite considerable efforts to have a common security 
framework throughout CIS countries, this objective has not been met. Seen by Moscow 
as a “personal” project, CIS has been used to exert political, economic, and military 
influence in former Soviet states through the use of peacekeeping forces and other 
tactics.201 Following the five-day Russian–Georgian conflict in 2008, Georgia withdrew 
from the CIS.202  
After the Georgian exit from the CIS, the organization has lost credibility and 
strength, with the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine refocusing their efforts on joining 
Europe.203 The role of CIS in the regional security of the Black Sea Basin is not 
significant, and CIS is considered “virtually moribund as a political organization,”204 The 
CIS also lacks economic and military influence, compared to other international actors 
exerting influence in the Black Sea Basin.205 
199 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), “About Commonwealth Countries,” CIS STAT, 
http://www.cisstat.com/index.html. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Global Security, “Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),” Military Global Security.org, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/cis.htm. 
202 European Dialog, “Georgia Quits ex-Soviet ‘Commonwealth,’” European Energy Security and 
Related Issues: In-Depth Analytical Coverage, http://eurodialogue.eu/Georgia-quits-ex-Soviet-
commonwealth. 
203 Timpul (magazine), “Analysis: Russia Pushes Moldova and Ukraine Out of the CIS and Europe 
Itself?,” Timpul.md, http://www.timpul.md/articol/analiza-rusia-impinge-moldova-si-ucraina-afara-din-csi-
si-pe-sine-din-europa-48696.html. 
204 Global Security, “Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),” Military Global Security.org. 
205 Ibid. 
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D. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS  
In this time of global and regional change, the security situation in the Black Sea 
Basin will continue to increasingly influence the security on the European continent, and 
even throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. The political and military dimension of this 
cooperation bears a decisive character in the security architecture of the 21st century. The 
Black Sea, as well as its extended area, are a source of wealth and have a strategic 
significance for regional and international actors.206 
However, the existing security threats in the Black Sea Basin are a barrier to the 
region’s multilateral development. These risks started with the security challenges arising 
after the reconstruction of ex-Soviet states, in a context of maintaining social harmony 
among various religious and ethnic groups, preserving territorial integrity, developing 
economic capacity, and securing energy supplies. Among all high-risk threats to security 
and stability, the “frozen conflicts” remain the main danger. These conflicts, which could 
escalate at any time, also are located in areas plagued by terrorist organizations, 
organized crime, and human and arms trafficking, thus creating instability in the Black 
Sea Basin. A collective contribution of the countries is essential to ensure a safe and 
secure environment. Assistance from international actors is necessary, even if their 
actions depend largely on their own political or economic interests in the region.  
In the context of energy conflicts and interests, combining the political and 
military dimensions, the Black Sea Basin became a central platform of diplomatic energy 
disputes between regional actors. Russian energy domination thwarts Europe’s desire to 
provide energy security for its community, as well as U.S. strategic interests, and makes 
the Black Sea Basin the point of intersection for the interests of the main global players. 
The region’s energy security depends on future energy alternatives, which involve 
cooperation, coordination, and stability. The objective requires the involvement of all the 
actors. 
206 European Commission, “Sea Basin Strategy: Black Sea,” Maritime Affairs, 
http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/sea_basins/black_sea/index_en.htm. 
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The EU and NATO enlargement, as well as democratization of different countries 
in Eastern Europe, will contribute significantly to the security balance in the Black Sea 
region. Also, joint energy exploitation of the region, between supply-consuming 
countries and transit states, could increase the security, as well as solve and prevent 
future regional conflicts. The current military conflict over Ukraine highlights once again 
the security fragility of this area. Involvement of the European Union and NATO in the 
solving process is considered by Russia a threat to its security. Also, since the Russian 
Federation is still a key Black Sea player, divergence between these powers will 
perpetuate a tense situation in the region. 
Finally, the Black Sea Basin can develop into a sphere of regional economic, 
political, and military cooperation or a confrontation stage between regional and 
international players. Security in the region depends on the identification of answers and 
solutions to the existing regional problems, which is not dependent on the strength and 
capabilities of a single state but requires the common effort of all the states in the Black 
Sea Basin and international actors. 
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III. REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA NATIONAL SECURITY AND ITS 
GEOPOLITICAL POSITION 
The international security architecture has undergone major changes since the 
Soviet Union collapsed. Countries that only yesterday were a component of the Soviet 
Union have found themselves independent, but with complex political, economic, 
military, and security problems. The Republic of Moldova was one of the “new” states 
that emerged after this historic event.  
In order to maintain their hard-earned status and ensure security, the former 
Soviet countries began to join different communities, military blocs, and international 
organizations. Countries of Central and Southeastern Europe largely chose the EU’s 
democratic values and NATO, taking into consideration the cost of ensuring their own 
security. Some Eastern Europe states decided to remain neutral and be part of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), with Russia at its center.  
Poised between the emerging alliance blocs, the Republic of Moldova followed its 
own course. Article 11 of the country’s constitution declared its permanent neutrality,207 
less out of genuine popular enthusiasm for neutrality than to account for the reality of the 
Transnitrian conflict and difficult geopolitical setting.  
Since its independence in 1991, the Moldovan government has established 
different relationships with its neighboring countries, regional states, and international 
actors, concerning its security. As a state with European aspirations, Moldova is 
restructuring its government systems and is willing to contribute more actively to 
regional security. Implementation of new reforms in the national legislative, economic, 
military, and security sectors, as well as drawing various security strategies are some of 
the key measures in this regard.208  
207 Moldova’s Constitution, Article 11, Adopted on July 29, 1994, Justice.md (this translation by the 
author), http://lex.justice.md/document_rom.php?id=44B9F30E:7AC17731. 
208 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Moldova Strategy,” EBRD Countries, 
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/country/moldova/strategy.shtml. 
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Currently, Moldova is facing a security problem oscillating between East and 
West and guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity. The available security 
options, embodied in Moldova’s constitution, are not many. Also, those options result 
from geopolitical setting, political and diplomatic issues, social and ethnic problems, 
energy dependence, as well as the existing frozen conflict on its territory. This chapter 
will explore the national security strategy that Moldova has, its energy security issues, 
and three frozen conflicts in the territory of the former Soviet Union, specifically related 
to their impact on regional security.  
A. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IN A SMALL STATE 
The few security options available to the Republic of Moldova are defined by its 
geopolitical setting, energy dependence, and political and diplomatic history, which 
include unresolved frozen conflicts that threaten the nation’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. For smaller states, drawing a security strategy becomes extremely challenging. 
Relatively limited power and resources frequently force these countries to adjust and 
reassess their approach to national security. Usually, the national interests of states 
crisscross with other regional or international security systems. Therefore, small states 
are forced to rethink their national security strategies for achieving their objectives. 
Moldova is one of these strategic innovators. 
1. Republic of Moldova National Security Strategy 
The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, adopted on July 29, 1994, serves as 
the legal basis for developing and implementing the nation’s security and defense.209 
Amidst political controversy,210 particularly relating to establishing closer ties with 
NATO, the Republic of Moldova adopted its first National Security Strategy on July 15, 
209 Republic of Moldova Constitution, Justice.md., 
http://lex.justice.md/document_rom.php?id=44B9F30E:7AC17731. 
210 Andrei Iovu, “National Security Strategy, Recommendations for National Security Strategy 
Implementation Process,” Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva: Institute 
for Public Policy 2011. 
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2011.211 Now mandatory in democratic countries, the National Security Strategy 
(NSS)—also called the National Strategy or Grand Strategy—is a policy act that 
identifies major national security threats and specifies counter-actions. Depending on the 
state’s national interests and security system, the National Security policy is also called a 
Concept, Strategy, Defense Doctrine, National Security Directive, or White Paper on 
Security and Defense. Such documents are important for “developing, applying, and 
coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and 
informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.”212  
Moldova’s National Security Strategy is based on the National Security 
Concept,213 which was adopted by parliament in May 2008. Starting from the idea that 
Moldova’s security is closely connected with that of other European countries and cannot 
be achieved alone, the National Security Strategy includes guidelines and security actions 
on a four- to seven-year term.214  
The strategy is also a medium term political and legal act that allows 
adaptation to internal and external developments in national security 
policy. Identifying specific segments of the national security system that 
require reform and developing a realistic plan of reform 
implementations.215 
211 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, “Decision no. 153 of the Parliament of 
Republic of Moldova on July 15, 2011,” Moldovan Parlament, (this translation by the author), 
http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=340510. 
212 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, “National Security Strategy,” Free Dictionary, 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/national+security+strategy. 
213 National Security Concept of the Republic of Moldova reflects the overall assessment of the 
security environment at the national and international level. The security concept defines national security 
purposes, the guidelines for basic national security, and the values and general principles to be protected by 
the Moldovan society. Also, the National Security Concept of the Republic of Moldova is considered a 
system of ideas that shape national security state priorities. 
214 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, “Decision no. 153 of the Parliament of 




                                                 
The strategy stipulates the legal framework for the divisions and subdivisions of 
the national security system, which must accord with the national security objectives, 
including: 
respect for the rule of law and the rules of human rights, institution 
building and democratic principles in the country, economic growth, 
ensuring civilian control over armed forces and force structures, 
implementing the principle of demilitarization in the institutions that have 
responsibilities for defense. Promote good relations with neighboring 
states, and proper protection of classified information. The strategy also 
includes actions needed in other areas of importance to national security, 
such as health, environment, education, and the fight against 
corruption.216 
According to the NSS, the fundamental interests of the Republic of Moldova are ensuring 
its sovereignty and territorial integrity, respecting and protecting human rights and 
freedoms, and defending its independence.217  
Once the Republic of Moldova had a National Security Strategy in place, the state 
institutions, which ensure state security, also had a clear mission in this regard. However, 
taking into consideration the geopolitical situation and country size, the need for 
flexibility and continuous adjustments of the NSS are necessary for facing new security 
threats. Also, a separate chapter, Chapter 3, is devoted to the National Security Strategy’s 
vision and actions to reinforce national security through foreign and defense policy. The 
National Security Strategy specifies that: 
[A] special place in the context of security lies in Moldova’s participation 
in global efforts, regional and sub-regional, to promote international 
stability and security cooperation within the UN, OSCE, NATO, and other 
relevant international organizations and participation missions under the 
Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU (CSDP).218 
216 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, “Decision no. 153 of the Parliament of 




                                                 
However, the state’s institutions that are responsible for development and 
implementation of National Security and Defense policy are the Moldovan Parliament, 
the President of the Republic of Moldova, the Supreme Security Council, the 
government, and ministries. 
Current approval of the National Security Strategy gives to the Republic of 
Moldova a new phase in security and defense policy, which initiates suitable reforms in 
this field and implementation of standards and practices. The modernization and 
adjustment of the legal framework is a key reform in this regard.219 Initiation and 
implementation of various security measurements, stipulated in the NSS, will 
demonstrate the determination and political will of the state to deal with actions that 
threaten the Moldova’s National Security. 
Different national and international security experts have criticized Moldova’s 
National Security Strategy.220 The main issues are related to the absence of an external 
dimension, and particularly the role and missions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
European Integration of the Republic of Moldova in this framework.221 In general, the 
National Security Strategy, the first of its kind, details a specific approach of a small 
country with developing democratic tendencies, and addresses the security problem in 
terms of its European evolution. The neutrality notions are persistent and interconnected 
with all of Moldova’s security options. Finally, the National Security Strategy of the 
Republic of Moldova displays the progress of Moldovan society and outlines the essential 
adjustments and transition to a democratic state, obeying the country’s constitution is the 
main objective of maintaining independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. 
219 Intelligence and Security Service of Republic of Moldova, “Reforms,” SIS.md, 
http://www.sis.md/ro/reforma. 





                                                 
2. Moldova’s Energy Security  
After transitioning to a market economy following independence, the Republic of 
Moldova became dependent on external energy providers. In terms of energy security, the 
government has focused on the supply and pricing of “oil, natural gas, solid fuel, and 
electrical and thermal energy.”222 The solutions in this respect have differed and 
sometimes conflicted with one another; however, they all had the final goal of the 
independence and energy security of the Republic of Moldova.223  
Energy security is conceived in principle as supplying the country with energy 
resources and at the lowest price possible.224 Reality does not match the options that 
Moldova has in this regard. For Moldova to achieve energy security, the country must 
diversify its supply to overcome dependence on Russia Federation. By diversifying the 
supply options Moldova also will improve its negotiating position to obtain resources and 
lower more competitive prices. In turn, access to lower-cost energy resources will 
contribute to the country’s overall national security.  
Designed in the Soviet Union era, the Republic of Moldova’s energy industry was 
a part of the energy system of the USSR. Its energy infrastructure was intended and built 
to supply resources to the entire Soviet space, not solely for Moldova. This infrastructure 
can be observed especially in the existing electricity sector, which cannot cover the entire 
energy demand of Moldova. While a supplying infrastructure exists in other energy 
sectors (e.g., oil and gas), since Moldova lacks its own natural resources and imports 98 
percent of its needs.225 
Further complicating energy security, since 1992 the Republic of Moldova has 
lost control of Soviet supply routes in 11 percent of its territory on the left bank of the 
Dniester River, where Transnistrian separatists control important energy transportation 
222 Virgiliu Mihailescu, Moldova’s Energy Security in the Context of Accession to the Energy 
Community (Chisinau: Foundation Soros-Moldova Bons Offices, 2010), 10. 
223 Ibid., 11. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Ibid., 13. 
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routes and infrastructure, including a compressor station and central gas pipelines.226 
Figure 9 highlights these segments:  
 
Figure 9.  The Moldova Gaz Network.227 
The Republic of Moldova’s energy infrastructure is a component of the “Balkan 
export corridor carrying Russian gas to Europe—[which] transited 17.9 bcm (billion 
cubic meters) of Russian gas to Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and western Turkey in 
2009.”228 Thus, the full “transit capacity of the network is 43‒44 bcm/year.”229 However, 
226 Alexandru Baltag, “Russia’s Energy Weapon as an Instrument of Pressure and Influence in the 
Former Soviet Union (the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine),” APE Foreign Policy Association, 
http://ape.md/. 
227 Katja Yafimava, The Transit Dimension of EU Energy Security: Russian Gas Transit across 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), Map 8.1: The Moldovan Gas 
Network, 263 (original source: Pirani (ed.), Russian and CIS Gas Markets). 
228 Yafimava, The Transit Dimension of EU Energy Security: Russian Gas Transit across Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Moldova, 262. 
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supplying the domestic and industrial consumers’ demand with natural gas has become a 
national issue for the Republic of Moldova, because Russia’s Gazprom controls the entire 
transit and distribution system of natural gas in Moldova’s territory. In addition to its 
economic leverage, Gazprom manipulates the price and supply of gas to influence 
Moldova’s decisions. This pressure by the Russian Federation on the internal and 
external processes of the country severely affects the energy security of the Republic of 
Moldova, making it vulnerable to Russian interests.230 
The Republic of Moldova is largely dependent on Russian energy resources. The 
economy works almost exclusively on these resources, which makes it vulnerable if 
Russia uses energy to promote its interests in Moldova. The Republic of Moldova has a 
strong need to diversify the energy resources import infrastructure, an action that requires 
strong political will and external assistance. The use of non-traditional methods of 
generating electricity (wind and sun), and connection to EU energy projects are viable 
solutions in this sense.231 These options should be explored not least because there is less 
probability that any one of several planned gas and oil projects (e.g., Nabucco, South 
Stream) will transit Moldova’s territory. So finding alternative energy sources is a 
strategic priority of the Republic of Moldova.232 Solutions that will diminish Russian 
influence in Moldova, increase diplomatic and political maneuvering ability of the 
country to act in various disputes with Russia, and strengthen the sovereignty and 
independence level of external actors will pave the way to achieving its national interests 
and security options. 
229 Yafimava, The Transit Dimension of EU Energy Security: Russian Gas Transit across Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Moldova, 262, quoted in V. Socor, “Gazprom Touts Agreements with Moldova as Models,” 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 4 January 2007. 
230 Alexandru Baltag and Dorina Baltag, “Republic of Moldova Energy Security: Viable 
Alternatives,” Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS) “Viitorul,” Public Policy, no. 3 
(2009), http://old.viitorul.org/public/2118/ro/STUDIU_ENERGETICA.pdf. 
231 Ibid., 35‒40. 
232 Republic of Moldova Government, “Energy Strategy of the Republic of Moldova Until 2030,” 
Decision no. 102, Justice.md, http://lex.justice.md/md/346670/. 
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B. REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON 
MOLDOVA’S NATIONAL SECURITY  
The Black Sea Basin, South Caucasus, and the Balkans are characterized by 
numerous tensions and conflicts (Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh), involving different countries and various international security 
organizations. Keeping these conflicts unsettled is also an object of geostrategic 
blackmail, creating separatist regimes in those areas and perfect conditions for 
smuggling, illegal migration, and crime. These and other risks are connected in time, as 
asymmetric, conventional, and non-military. For the Republic of Moldova, the existence 
of a frozen conflict in its territory for more than 24 years has significantly harmed the 
country’s security and multilateral development.  
1. Transnistrian Conflict 
The Transnistrian conflict is a dispute that started in March 1991, between 
Moldovan legal forces and the separatist region. The self-proclaimed “Dniestr Republic,” 
also now called the Moldavian Transnistrian region, (Figure 10) was created in 1990 by 
ethnic Russians. The active phase of the conflict lasted less than a year and resulted in 
hundreds of deaths and the destruction of homes and infrastructure. In July 1992, a 
ceasefire was declared and the Transnistrian conflict became a “frozen conflict,” 
establishing a “security zone” and a peacekeeping mission on the Dniester River. The 
peacekeeping forces have more than 400 personnel from four sides (Moldova, Russia, 
Ukraine, and Transnistrian separatists). Also, a solving mechanism for this conflict was 
created, represented by the 5+2 format of the negotiation process. The five mediators and 
two observers in the negotiation process are: the Republic of Moldova, the Russian 
Federation, Ukraine, the OSCE, and Transnistria, with the United States and European 
Union with observer status.233 
233 Woehrel, Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy, 3.  
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Figure 10.  Moldova’s Transnistria and Gagauz regions.234 
The Transnistrian conflict is based not on ethnic or religious grievances, as the 
Transnistrian separatist regime and Russia are trying to argue, but on a fairly standard 
political and geopolitical conflict.235 The Moldovan ethnic group constitutes the largest 
group forming 40 percent of the entire population in the region.236 
Moldova’s separatist region of Transnistria continues to be a destabilizing 
security factor and in Eastern Europe. Despite the efforts of the United States, European 
Union, and OSCE to withdraw Russian troops from Transnistria, the Russian Federation 
234 Ibid. 
235 Olga Savceac, “Transnistria-Moldova Conflict,” ICE Case Studies, No. 182 (May 2006), 
http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/moldova.htm. 
236 Woehrel, Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy. 
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considers these forces as its strategic “forward military base.”237 Russia maintains the 
former 14th Soviet army (currently known as the Operational Group of Russian Forces in 
the Transnistrian region of Moldova (OGRF)), even though according to the 1999 OSCE 
Istanbul summit, Russia is committed to withdraw its troops238 from Moldovan 
territory.239  
The conflict now is in a lull thanks to the more active involvement of different 
international security organizations. Also, Transnistria is on the agenda of the EU 
Security Strategy and remains an object of regional geopolitical disputes with a high risk 
of instability.240 The 5+2 format is still considered the main problem-solving mechanism 
by the Russia, which is one of the main players in this format. However, the Moldovan 
President Nicolae Timofti argues that the actual format is ineffective and advocates 
changing this format or replacing it with a civilian mission. 
The current format of 5 +2 negotiations for settlement of the Transnistrian 
conflict has proved ineffective. I think it is appropriate to examine the 
possibility of modifying this mechanism in order to streamline the 
negotiations.241 
However, transforming the military peacekeeping mission under the Russian aegis 
to a civilian mission under international mandate is viewed as a priority for the Moldovan 
government in the settlement process of the Transnistrian conflict.242 
237 Ion Preasca, “Moscow Turns Transnistria in a Russian Military Base,” Adevarul.md Politics, 
http://adevarul.ro/moldova/politica/moscova-transforma-transnistria-intr-o-baza-militara-rusa-
1_50aeb0e97c42d5a6639f2c0f/index.html. 
238 At the OSCE summit in 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin pledged that the Russian military 
equipment would be withdrawn from Moldova’s territory in 2001. Also by the end of 2002 the withdrawal 
of all Russian troops would follow. This action was not met until recently. 
239 Christopher J. Borgen, “Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in 
Moldova a Report from the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,” St. John’s University School 
of Law, Research Paper No. 06–0045, July 25, 2006. 19, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=920151. 
240 Vladimir Socor, “Negotiations on the Transnistria Conflict in a Deep Freeze,” European Dialogue, 
http://www.eurodialogue.eu/osce/Negotiations-On-The-Transnistria-Conflict-In-A-Deep-Freeze. 
241 Luminiţa Bogdan, “Nicolae Timofti Wants to Change the 5 + 2 Format on Transnistria: The 
Current Negotiation Format is Inefficient,” Mediafax.ro, http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/nicolae-timofti-
vrea-modificarea-formatului-5-2-privind-transnistria-actualul-format-de-negocieri-este-ineficient-
12488414. 
242 Government of Republic of Moldova, “Program of Activity for Country Reintegration,” Bureau of 
Reintegration, http://www.gov.md/slidepageview.php?l=en&idc=631. 
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The leadership of the Transnistrian separatists region does not give any indication 
that they will agree to return to the constitutional law of the Republic of Moldova. They 
are still engaged in an intense process of adopting Russian legislation in the Transnistrian 
region243 and the pursuit of solving the conflict through recognition by the Russian 
Federation.244 Despite the efforts made by all actors participating in the settlement 
process, the Transnistrian conflict remains unsettled and destabilizing for the Republic of 
Moldova and the whole region. 
2. South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
Separatist fighting in Ossetia since 1990 has left thousands of Georgians dead or 
displaced. The ceasefire agreement between Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze 
and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on July 24, 1992, in Sochi created separatist enclaves 
and brought Russian peacekeeping forces to Georgia.245 After the Soviet Union 
collapsed, particularly during 1992‒1993, independence movements started in the South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia region, intensively supported by Russia long before the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union.246 Figure 11 highlights these separatist enclaves: 
243 Moldova.org, “After the Crimea, in the Russian Composition is Asked and Transnistria,” 
Moldova.org, http://www.moldova.org/dupa-crimeea-componenta-rusiei-se-cere-si-transnistria/. 
244 Clifford J. Levy, “Russia Backs Independence of Georgian Enclaves,” New York Times, August 
26, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/europe/27russia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
245 Cristian Negrea Blog, “Lessons from the 2008 Russian-Georgian Conflict,” June 25, 2010, 
http://cristiannegrea.blogspot.com/2010/07/invatamintele-conflictului-ruso.html. 
246 Călin Hentea, “Six-Day War in Georgia,” Historia.ro, 
http://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/general/articol/razboiul-sase-zile-georgia. 
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Figure 11.  Map of Georgia with South Ossetia and Abkhazia.247 
Contested by Russia for alleged lawlessness, the 2008 presidential election left 
Saakashvili in power but with a weaker political position.248 Although Russia claimed to 
want an improvement in relations with Georgia, the declaration of Kosovo independence 
on February 17, 2008, followed by the lifting of sanctions on Abkhazia by Russia 20 days 
later, markedly damaged relations.249 
Increasing Russian support of separatist enclaves in the South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia has worsened relations considerably, reaching a low point on August 8, 2008, 
when armed conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and the Russian 
Federation began. The conflict lasted five days and ended with a peace plan after a high-
level meeting between Russia and France (Medvedev-Sarkozy 6 Point Peace Plan for the 
247 Nations Online, “Administrative Map of Georgia,” One World - Nations Online, 
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/georgia_map.htm. 
248 The European Elections Monitor, “Mikheil Saakashvili is Re-elected President of the Republic of 
Georgia in the First Round,” Foundation Robert Schuman, http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/eem/0747-
mikheil-saakashvili-is-re-elected-president-of-the-republic-of-georgia-in-the-first-round. 
249 Sergiu Căpîlnean, Romania Reaction on the Conflict in Georgia in 2008 - A Constructivist 
Perspective (Bucharest: Academy of Economic Studies, 2012), 2, 
http://www.academia.edu/3201503/Romania_in_conflictul_din_Georgia_din_2008. 
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Georgia War).250 On August 26, 2008, Russia also recognized the independence of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia and installed military bases and checkpoints in the separatist 
regions.251  
The August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict caused much damage to 
Georgia’s economy and military, as well as contributing to hundreds of 
casualties and tens of thousands of displaced persons in Georgia. The 
United States quickly pledged $1 billion in humanitarian and recovery 
assistance for Georgia. In early 2009, the United States and Georgia 
signed a Strategic Partnership Charter, which pledged U.S. support for 
democratization, economic development, and security reforms in Georgia. 
The Obama Administration has provided ongoing support for Georgia’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.252 
However, Georgia does not recognize the separatist regions, South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, and considers these territories occupied. Although committed to “solve the 
conflict only by peaceful means and diplomatic efforts,”253 the Russian Federation led its 
first military operation in a neighboring state in this conflict, which has directly 
threatened the security of the country.254 If for some states this conflict represents a 
challenge from the Russian Federation, for Russia it appears to be a restatement of its role 
as a great regional power. The Republic of Moldova’s Transnistrian conflict has more in 
common with the Georgian separatist regions, serving as a possible threat scenario to the 
country’s national security. 
250 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, “Russian MFA Information and Press 
Department Commentary Regarding Implementation of the Medvedev-Sarkozy Plan,” MID Official Site, 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/170AA7CEA77E7EFBC32574B70059F7D4. 
251 Council of Europe, “Implementation of Resolution 1633 (2008) on the Consequences of the War 
between Georgia and Russia,” Parliamentary Assembly, 
http://www.coe.int/t/r/parliamentary_assembly/%5Brussian_documents%5D/%5B2009%5D/%5BJan2009
%5D/Res1647_rus.asp. 
252 Jim Nichol, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests (CRS Report No. 97–
727) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 21, 2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-
727.pdf 
253 Council of the European Union, HR Declaration on Behalf of the EU on the Georgian Strategy on 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Diplomatic Papers, March 11, 2010, (Brussels, 7381/1/10 REV 1 (Presse 59), 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press/press-releases/latest-press-releases?lang=en. 
254 Cristian Negrea Blog, “Lessons from the 2008 Russian-Georgian Conflict.” 
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3. Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict 
The unsettled ethnic conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian majority 
enclave within the territory of Azerbaijan (Figure 12), is perhaps is the most complex and 
long-lasting of all the conflicts in the post-Soviet area. The conflict is between two states, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have irreconcilable positions.255  
 
Figure 12.  Map of Azerbaijan with Nagorno-Karabakh region.256 
The separatist movements started in 1987, during the Soviet Union era. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet countries became independent, including 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 1991, with the increased support from Armenia, the 
Nagorno-Karabakh proclaimed its independence in 1991, leading to the outbreak of war 
in 1992‒1993.257  
The war ended in 1994, resulting in the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh 
by Armenia. The consequences of the war were quite serious: tens of 
thousands of deaths, mostly Azeri, hundreds of thousands of refugees from 
255 Plop Andrei Blog, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” January 30, 2014, 
http://plopandrei.blogspot.com/2014/01/coflictul-din-nagorno-karabah.html. 
256 Jim Nichol, Azerbaijan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests (CRS Report 97–522), 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 22, 2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-
522.pdf. 
257 Teodora Mățău, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” Geopolitics.ro, http://geopolitics.ro/conflictul-
din-nagorno-karabah/. 
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both ethnic groups, forced to leave their homes and live in poverty. 
Separatists and the Armenian army continues to occupy and now an 
important part (about 20 percent) of the territory of Azerbaijan. Although 
conflict is considered frozen at the end of the war, so far about 3,000 
people have died in ambushes.258 
At the insistence of the international community, the Russian Federation and 
OSCE brokered a ceasefire agreement (called the Bishkek Protocol) in May 1994 among 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The document served as a starting point 
for the negotiation process to determine the future status of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
enclave.259 
The situation in the South Caucasus remains tense, as demonstrated by recent 
outbreaks of violence in the region.260 The Nagorno-Karabakh is seeking independence, 
while the Azerbaijan government threatens with violence if Armenia refuses to extract its 
troops from the region. In this context, the Russian Federation has supported the 
Armenians, with whom they share the Orthodox Christian faith, whereas Turkey has 
supported Muslim Azerbaijanis as a part of Turk Muslim ties. Because of rich natural 
resources in Azerbaijan, the European Union, United States, Iran, and China also have 
become interested, elevating the importance and danger of this conflict from a regional to 
an international level, with adverse effects for countries in close proximity.261 
C. SECURITY PROSPECTS  
Moldova’s security options must result from its geographical positioning and its 
existing capabilities. Also, the Republic of Moldova cannot ensure its own security 
independently. The lack of capabilities and its reduced size compared with neighboring 
258 Ibid. 
259 Azerbaijan Republic Garabagh Region, “Agreement on Ceasefire,” Garabagh Conflict, 
http://garabagh.net/content_176_en.html. 
260 Aljazeera America, “Clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh Reignite Fears between Armenia, Azerbaijan,” 
Aljazeera.com, August 2, 2014, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/8/2/armenia-
azerbaijanclashes.html. [There were 15 deaths in the previous days of violence between Azeri forces and 
Armenian separatists, which brings the risk of conflict in the South Caucasus region, an area with important 
oil and natural gas resources crossing the Caspian region to Europe. Russia is also worried about a possible 
escalation of the conflict.] 
261 Mățău, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.” 
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countries, the presence of Russian troops since 1991 on Moldova territory, its geopolitical 
setting between the European Union and Russia, and the modern security frameworks, 
which encourage commune security systems, force Moldova to adjust its National 
Security Strategy to these standards.262 However, the Republic of Moldova’s recent 
National Security Strategy specifies the significance of consolidated security within the 
United Nations, OSCE, and NATO, and the importance of contributing to the Security 
and Defense Policy of the European Union.263  
In response to NATO expansion and the aspirations of the Republic of Moldova 
to join the European Union, the Russian Federation has been using its economic, 
political, and military leverages to destabilize the country’s security and influence its 
political course. Although the objectives of the various frozen conflicts in the region 
vary, all have been used by the Russian Federation to control many of the former Soviet 
countries in the region.  
Therefore, the Republic of Moldova has a strong need to diversify energy 
resources and improve its infrastructure, actions that require strong political will and 
external assistance. The use of non-traditional methods of getting electricity (e.g., wind 
and solar) and connecting to EU energy projects are viable solutions.264 Pursuing these 
options is a strategic priority for the Republic of Moldova.265 According to the World 
Bank, the country’s economic development is tied to its National Development Strategy 
(NDS). Improving energy efficiency, roads, and infrastructure are among the important 
strategic priorities specified by the Moldova 2020 development strategy.266 
262 Iulian Chifu, Security Decision in Moldova: Contributions to a Romania Policy to East, 
(Bucharest: Editura Cartea Veche, 2009), 139‒140.  
263 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, “Decision no. 153 of the Parliament of 
Republic of Moldova on 15, July 2011,” Justice.md, (this translation by the author), 
http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=340510. 
264 Ibid.,. 35‒40. 
265 Republic of Moldova Government, “Energy Strategy of the Republic of Moldova Until 2030,” 
Decision no. 102, February 5, 2013, Justice.md, http://lex.justice.md/md/346670/. 
266 The World Bank, “Moldova Overview, Strategy,” 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/moldova/overview#2. 
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The Transnistrian conflict, as well as those of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and 
South Ossetia, certainly will remain frozen as long as necessary. The current situation in 
the region is entirely favorable to the Russian Federation’s security, and is a plausible 
excuse for them to exert political influence in Georgia, Republic of Moldova, and 
Ukraine directly, as well as maintain a military presence close to the NATO border.  
The Republic of Moldova, through endorsement of the first National Security 
Strategy, has demonstrated its political will to ensure the country’s security. Also, 
recognizing the importance of security drives development and implementation of the 
country’s democratic values. The contribution to common security and promoting 
stability and international security is central for Moldova, which will benefit from 
capacity building and reforming the national security sector structures. Considering 
Moldova’s complex positioning and the various security issues facing Eastern Europe, 
the National Security Strategy comes to answer the security needs and stipulates the 
missions for Moldova’s security forces. Even though the strategy does not include the full 
range of asymmetric threats and sometimes has a diplomatic character (specific to small 
countries) it is a deck launch for the development and improvement for the strategies that 
will come, ready to respond to all the threats to the Moldova national security. 
 66 
IV. MOLDOVA’S ARMED NEUTRALITY: REFLECTIONS ON 
AUSTRIAN AND FINLAND NEUTRALITY  
That’s the problem with Neutrals—you never know where you stand. 
—Zapp Brannigan 
 
The major benefit of neutrality is political autonomy, but to be efficient the 
neutral status of a state must be internationally recognized, particularly by big powers. 
States that choose neutrality also must possess the necessary capabilities to be able to 
protect their territory and deny access to alien forces. Historically, however, many states 
that have declared their neutrality have suffered military invasions. For example, during 
World War I, Germany disregarded the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg to engage 
in war with France.267 During World War II, this pattern of aggression continued when 
Nazi Germany invaded the neutral states of Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands.268 However, during this time, Sweden and Switzerland, neutral 
states with armed capabilities, avoided attacks on their territories. Examples that 
differentiate the neutrality notion, which is perceived differently in various settings by the 
nation states, assimilated more as a “foreign policy rather than a legal norm.”269 
The Republic of Moldova, a small state located between two dominant neighbors, 
constitutionally stipulated its permanent neutrality in 1994. Given the current geopolitical 
situation, the pursuit of a policy of armed neutrality, explained further in this chapter, 
may be a better approach for ensuring the country’s long-term national interests and 
security, considering the practice of Austria and Finland and Moldova’s desired neutrality 
position. 
267 Andre Weiss, “The Violation by Germany of the Neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg,” in 
Studies and Documents on the War, translated by Walter Thomas (Paris: Library Armand Colin, 1915), 
7‒11.  
268 Peter C. Chen, “Invasion of Denmark and Norway 9 Apr 1940 - 10 Jun 1940,” World War II 
Database, http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=93. 
269 Andrew Clapham and Paola Gaeta, Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict 
(United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014), 248. 
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A. NEUTRALITY CONCEPT 
Originating from the “Latin ne uter, meaning neither the one nor the other,”270 
neutrality is a notion widely used in international law. Neutral states cannot participate in 
war with other states or take part in military blocs as belligerents. There are two types of 
neutrality: permanent and temporary, also known as wartime and peacetime neutrality.271 
Countries like Austria, Finland, Switzerland, and Sweden enforce neutrality in different 
ways. For example, Austria conceives of its neutrality as a “constitutional value,” rather 
than a formal, legal status, particularly now that Austria participates in collective security 
in the international environment, notably peacekeeping missions in the Middle East and 
Africa. On the other hand, Switzerland has a more elaborated approach to its neutrality 
status. Neutrality is embedded in Swiss history and security policy. Also, Swiss neutrality 
is directly linked with the country’s national interests and represents the security and 
stability instrument that Switzerland uses for its security.272  
The neutrality concept in the security context is depicted in a number of different 
ways identifying various types of neutrality. Thus, perpetual neutrality is based on a 
special treaty. By comparison, general neutrality applies to an entire state territory, 
whereas partial neutrality is when only part of state territory is neutral, for instance, by 
some agreement. Voluntary neutrality is when a state adopts the neutral status 
voluntarily, and conventional neutrality is when there is a specific treaty that forces the 
state to stay neutral. Armed neutrality is when a state adopts military measures to ensure 
its neutrality. Benevolent neutrality is described by the neutral manners of a state, and 
absolute or qualified neutrality assume supporting one of the belligerent.273 In the 
Republic of Moldova case, the voluntary neutrality and benevolent neutrality is closer to 
270 Ibid. 
271 Gunther Hauser, “Military Security and the Concept of Neutrality,” in The Armed Forces and 
International Security Global Trends and Issues, edited by Jean M. Callaghan and Franz Kernic (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 321. 
272 Central Intelligence Agency, “Switzerland,” World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sz.html.  
273 Oppenheim, International Law Vol. II: War and Neutrality. 
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its model of neutrality. However, a state can use one or more types of neutrality at the 
same time, depending on its security requirements.  
Two Hague Conventions that entered into force in 1910 (e.g., Laws of War: 
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land [Hague V], 
and Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War [Hague XII]) 
provide the fundamental legal basis of the neutrality notion.274 The core obligations of 
the neutral state are: no military involvement in any conflicts, no military support to any 
country involved in the conflict, and equal attitudes towards belligerents. The neutral 
state also is obligated to use its own armed forces to defend its territory and avoid 
violation of its neutrality by belligerents, requiring respect for its neutrality275  
B. REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA NEUTRALITY 
The first point of Article 11 of Moldova’s 1991 constitution states that the 
“Republic of Moldova proclaims its permanent neutrality,” and the second point of the 
same article manifests the country’s position toward the presence of foreign troops: “the 
Republic of Moldova shall not allow the dispersal of foreign military troops on its 
territory.”276  
Perceived first as an optimal option, over time it was demonstrated that 
Moldova’s neutrality status was a desire of Russia, which sought to maintain and expand 
its geopolitical influence in the area. This neutral status was transformed later into an 
instrument of political pressure.277 
Russia’s desire to return and maintain its control over former Soviet countries led 
to the establishment of CIS. Besides the economic and social elements, the creation of the 
CIS has provided the Russian Federation a lawful position by which to maintain troops in 
the CIS countries. In this context, the permanent neutrality status of the Republic of 
274 Clapham and Gaeta, Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict, 249. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Presidency of the Republic of Moldova, “Constitution of the Republic of Moldova,” General 
Principles, http://www.president.md/titlul1. 
277 Vasile Botnaru, “Neutrality as Insecurity,” Radio Free Europe, 
http://www.europalibera.org/content/article/1821448.html. 
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Moldova has served to reject Russia’s request for military cooperation. Thus, neutrality 
has consolidated Moldova’s independence and averted Russian dominance, although this 
position has made Moldova’s joining NATO debatable.278  
Another critical element in Moldova’s neutrality, which significantly influences 
the country’s internal and external affairs, is that its permanent neutrality is not 
internationally recognized.279 However, to some extent, this situation offers Moldova a 
flexible and favorable position. For example, international recognition of its permanent 
neutral status will force the Russian troops to withdraw from Moldova territory. 
Promoting Euro-Atlantic integration also will be inconvenient for Russia. Both options 
involve risks and opportunities for the security and future of the Republic of Moldova.280 
However, considering the country’s permanent neutral status stipulated by its 
constitution, position which is broadly supported by the elected officials and political 
parties, to some extent indicate the country’s chosen vector.281 Certainly the international 
environment is changing constantly, requiring states to adjust their internal and external 
policies. Resulting from its geopolitical situation and national interests, the Republic of 
Moldova must choose the optimal options to ensure the country’s security/territorial 
278 BBC, “HARDtalk on Location: Iurie Leancă,” BBC News, July 31, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04dqrqp; Iurie Leanca, the Prime Minister of Moldova declared on 
radio BBC that “Neutrality is a Concept. Joining a military Bloc could be a target. We should carefully 
examine the real situation. We need to find a consensus with NATO, we have a frozen conflict, but we 
have a domestic public opinion unfavorable of NATO.”  
279 Vladimir Socor, “Guarantee of Neutrality is a New Russian Trap to Condition an Unconditional 
Obligation - The Withdrawal of its Troops,” Flux National Cotidian, No.200856 (March 28, 2008), 
http://www.flux.md/editii/200856/articole/2660/. 
280 CID NATO, “Neutrality Status of the Republic of Moldova in the Context of 20 Years of 
Independence and Cooperation with of NATO and Partner Countries in this Status,” Newsletter 
Partnership For Security, no. 4 (August 25, 2011), transcript of radio broadcast of August 25, 2011 made 
by Radio Moldova in collaboration with the Center for Information and Documentation on of NATO in 
Moldova and with the financial support of NATO Public Diplomacy Department, 
http://nato.md/uploads/Analize%20si%20comentarii/Transcripturi%20Emisiuni%20RADIO/2011/transcrip
t%2025.08.pdf. 
281 InfoTag, “Politics,” News, June 20, 2014, http://www.infotag.md/politics-ro/189807/; The Prime 
Minister of RM Iurie Leanca mentions that Moldova may increase neutrality, creating a solid foundation 
for regional stability declaring that “Our European integration means, above all, strengthening Moldova’s 
sovereignty, not reducing it or making it vulnerable. We do it by building state institutions, becoming part 
of a family of prosperous relations which are based on mutual respect. Taking the model of countries such 
as Austria or Sweden we have a chance to strengthen the concept of neutrality, which will create a solid 
foundation of stability in the region.” 
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integrity, and avoid military conflicts. It can look to some of its neutral neighbors in this 
connection. 
C. AUSTRIA’S NEUTRALITY  
Austrian neutrality is based on a treaty signed in 1955 by the Soviet Union, the 
United States, Great Britain, and France. The treaty “granted Austria independence and 
arranged for the withdrawal of all occupation forces.”282 Signing this treaty, the Allies 
predicted that Austrian neutrality would serve as a “buffer zone” between the USSR and 
the West. This treaty represents the only case during the Cold War era when the Soviet 
Union extracted its forces from an occupied country.283 
According to Article 1 of the Austrian Constitution, ratified on October 26, 1955: 
(1) For the purpose of the permanent maintenance of her external 
independence and for the purpose of the inviolability of her territory, 
Austria, of her own free will, declares herewith her permanent neutrality 
which she is resolved to maintain and defend with all the means at her 
disposal. (2) In order to secure these purposes, Austria will never in the 
future accede to any military alliances nor permit the establishment of 
military bases of foreign States on her territory.284 
Nevertheless, following its neutrality, Austria promoted an intensive foreign 
policy, which demonstrates the country’s commitment to join international security 
organizations.285 In 1955, Austria joined the United Nations (UN), and since 1960 has 
provided peacekeeping troops for various UN missions, including currently in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, the Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Somalia, Cyprus, and Syria.286 Despite its neutral status, an Austrian also 
282 U.S. Department of State, “Austrian State Treaty, 1955,” Archive, http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/107185.htm. 
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held the UN high position of Secretary General from 1971 to 1981.287 For many years, 
the country has additionally brokered relations between East and West, hosting 
disarmament meetings in the setup of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe.288 
On January 1, 1995, after a long process of integration that had started in 1989, 
Austria became an EU member.289 In this context, reflecting the political will of two-
thirds of Austrians voters expressed in a 1994 referendum, Austria adopted a national 
strategy of common defense. Along with Austria’s Act of Accession to the EU, the 
country also amended its constitution. Accordingly, the CSDP has priority over Austrian 
Constitutional Law on Austria’s Permanent Neutrality.290 
In connection with the ratification of the EU Treaty as amended by the 
Amsterdam European Council, Art. 23f of the constitution was further 
amended in the sense of clarifying that Austria’s participation in missions 
in the framework of the “Petersberg-Tasks” (including peace enforcement 
combat missions) is not to be restricted by the Federal Constitutional Law 
on Austria’s Permanent Neutrality.291 
However, Austria is not seeking NATO membership. Nevertheless, the country’s 
“neutrality remains technical” because Austria has participated in NATO’s Partnership 
for Peace (1995) and NATO missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996) and Kosovo 
(1999).292 The PfP agreement, signed between Austria and NATO in 1995, outlines the 
essential domains of cooperation: “Cooperation to strengthen peace and stability in the 
Euro-Atlantic Area; Protecting and advancing Democracy and Human Rights; Upholding 
the principles of International Law; Fulfilling the obligations set out in the Charter of the 
287 Lahodynsky, “The Changing Face of Austrian Neutrality.” 
288 Ibid. 
289 Austrian Foreign Ministry, “Austria in the EU,” Foreign Policy, 
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United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights.”293 This document allows Austria, 
even with its neutral status, to cooperate with NATO and the PfP states in peacekeeping 
missions, humanitarian and disaster relief, and search and rescue operations.294 These 
missions have included JFOR/SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995‒2004), KFOR in 
Kosovo (since 1999), ISAF in Afghanistan, and KFOR in (2008‒2009).295  
For Austria, PfP cooperation is essential for ensuring its interoperability with 
NATO and other PfP countries, which allows its contribution to multinational missions. 
Considering that a majority of NATO members are also EU members, Austria’s military 
involvement with NATO highlights its central importance to the alliance.296 Its 
rationalized neutrality status today promotes the country’s interests, ensures its national 
security, and contributes to regional defense. 
D. FINLAND’S NEUTRALITY 
Finland’s independence and neutrality derives from 1917, when it self-declared its 
status. Its neutrality policy, weak from the beginning, involved Finland in both world 
wars, struggling to maintain its sovereignty from the USSR.297 The country’s neutral 
position was recognized in the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance (FCMA), signed between the Soviet Union and Finland. This treaty allowed 
Soviet military bases on Finnish soil and bound Finland to protect its neutrality using its 
armed forces.  
293 Austrian Foreign Ministry, “Austria Participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC),” Foreign Policy, http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-
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Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), Foreign Policy, http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-
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Finland was not made part of the Soviet military alliance, but was obliged 
only to defend its own territory if attacked by Germany or by countries 
allied with that country, or if the Soviet Union were attacked by these 
powers through Finnish territory. In addition, consultations between 
Finland and the Soviet Union were required if the threat of such an attack 
were established. According to the FCMA treaty, Finland was not bound 
to aid the Soviet Union if that country were attacked elsewhere, and the 
consultations were to be between sovereign states, not between military 
allies. Just what constituted a military threat was not specified, but the 
right of the Finns to discuss the posited threat and how it should be met, 
that is, to what extent military assistance would be required, allowed 
Finnish officials room for maneuver and deprived the treaty of an 
automatic character.298 
In this context, Finland maintains its neutrality policy to protect its territory and 
independence. Also, the FCMA treaty stipulates Finland’s aspiration to the UN principles 
of peace and requires the Finnish non-involvement in the European Recovery Program 
(Marshall Plan).299 As in the Austrian case, Finland enforced its neutrality as a feasible 
solution against Soviet dominance.300 
To avoid problems with the USSR during World War II, Finland took a cautious 
political approach to joining various Western-initiated economic and financial programs, 
such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Bank.301 
Finnish neutrality took a more preeminent shape when the USSR withdrew its forces 
from the vicinity of Helsinki in 1955, and Finland joined the UN and Nordic Council. In 
1960, Finland’s neutrality was internationally recognized. Since then, the country’s 
neutrality has been used more effectively in promoting Finnish security interests in the 
international arena.302  
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During the Cold War, NATO played an important role in Finnish security 
architecture. The neutrality of Sweden, as well as the positioning of Norway and 
Denmark as NATO countries, particularly made Finnish neutrality essential for ensuring 
its security and playing a central role between West and East.303 The important role that 
Finland has played in the nonaligned community can be seen in its leadership role in the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free 
Zone (NWFZ), and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).304 
For Finland, neutrality provided an opportunity to contribute to regional security 
and modernize its defense potential. However, military deterrence has not been the main 
pillar on which Finnish neutrality has been based.305 Although Finland joined the 
European Union in 1995 to ensure its national security and improve its development, the 
country has maintained its neutrality through military non-alignment and autonomous 
defense.306  
Finland’s neutrality has its roots in the beginning of 20th century, and the country 
is perceived as a product of its foreign policy in its struggle avoiding the influence of the 
USSR. Finland’s “choice of neutrality was motivated by security policy,”307 and its 
improvement was dictated by its history. Among various forms of neutrality, Finland’s 
neutrality status is different compared with other neutrals. Viewed as a “policy of 
neutrality” or “aimed at neutrality” rather than pure neutrality,”308 the Finnish type of 
neutrality seems to work well for the country.309 Thus, acting as a non-aligned country, 
303 Jaakko Blomberg, “Finland’s Evolving Security Policy,” Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs, Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, NATO on Line Library, 
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Finland is an EU member with full rights also; their involvement in PfP NATO projects 
is central and concomitant in keeping its good relations with the Russia Federation, which 
provides for them the necessary security architecture specific for a small country with a 
strong neighbor.310 
E. ARMED NEUTRALITY  
Besides the different types of neutrality identified in the international security 
environment, armed neutrality is a particular model, which gives options to the neutrals 
states to arm themselves and build their defence capability against all hostility that 
threatens their neutrality. The concept of armed neutrality has been defined in military, 
legal, and political science, as well. However, in all of these contexts the focus is on 
creating, building, and maintaining an armed capability of a neutral state strong enough 
to protect its neutrality. Armed neutrality is legally defined in international politics as an 
attitude of a state or group of states which makes no alliance with either 
side in a war. It is the condition of a neutral power, at war, which holds 
itself ready to resist by force any aggression of either belligerent. Such 
states assert that they will defend themselves against resulting incursions 
from all parties.311  
The history of armed neutrality is documented by Andrew Clapham and Paola 
Gaeta in the Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict.312 They argue 
that armed neutrality was first conceptualized in 1780 by a Russian initiative. The treaty 
was signed by Prussia, Austria, Denmark, Portugal, and Sweden, establishing rules 
regarding the treatment of neutral ships. The second case of armed neutrality noted by the 
authors arose in 1800 from a British naval blockade during the Napoleonic Wars. The 
armed neutrality treaty was signed by Russia, Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia in response 
to Great Britain’s refusal to exempt neutral ships from searches. Thus, it made “armed 
neutrality” the first term used between states in war on land and sea concerning the 
310 Ibid. 
311 U.S. Legal, “Armed Neutrality Law & Legal Definition,” USLegal, 
http://definitions.uslegal.com/a/armed-neutrality/.  
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neutrality. The Hague Conventions of 1907 defined the term of neutrality and its various 
forms, specifying its rights and duties in a legal framework.313 
Armed neutrality was and still is used by different neutral countries, such as 
Switzerland, Austria, and Finland, to ensure their national security interests, because of 
their size, power, and geopolitical settings. However, their neutrality still allows them to 
keep and modernize their own armed forces and contribute to their national and regional 
security, as well. Along with other forms of neutrality, armed neutrality seems to be a 
plausible solution for neutral states in ensuring their security and protect their 
sovereignty.  
F. ARMED NEUTRALITY PERSPECTIVES FOR MOLDOVA 
Unlike Austria and Finland, whose neutrality was negotiated, Moldova’s current 
neutrality status was imposed to avoid direct Russian control as a “consequence of 
defeat” and “military occupation”314 shortly after the country declared its independence.  
Moldova’s neutrality is rationalization of the status quo, which is an 
attempt to explain / define a fact subsequently spent over capacity control 
of Chisinau. And how military occupation must have a name, was given 
the name of neutrality. Unlike most of the former Soviet Union states, 
Chisinau was defeated by the Empire or its extensions after the collapse. 
The neutrality was chosen as a name for the occupation and for the second 
stage of confrontation with the Empire, after the military defeat itself.315 
Since that time, the Moldovan government has used neutrality as a security 
instrument in crisis situations.316 However, rather than serving as an efficient tool for 
crisis management, the country’s permanent neutrality status has created deadlock 
situations and deprived Moldova of other security options.317 Regarding the current 
situation, which also favors the Russian Federation and its regional interests, one scholar 
313 Ibid. 
314 Dan Dungaciu, “Foreword,” quoted in Chifu Iulian, Security Decision in Moldova: Contributions 
to a Romania policy to East (Bucharest: Editura Cartea Veche, 2009), 9. 
315 Ibid., (this translation by the author.) 
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has observed, “Moldova does not have neutrality, at least one that offers security and 
internal stability.”318  
Moldova’s chance to overcome Soviet influence in the early 1990s, turn to 
democratic values, and adopt a free market economy, as Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia 
did, was lost shortly after the USSR breakdown.319 In view of recent events in Ukraine 
and throughout the region, the best security option for Moldova today may be the pursuit 
of a policy of armed neutrality. In the absence of a consolidated position referring to 
NATO and EU accession, such political positioning would provide Moldova with 
opportunities for working efficiently with both neighboring nations and the West, as well 
as maintaining good relations with the dominant political, military, and economic force in 
the region: the Russian Federation. The successful application of such a model of armed 
neutrality in Moldova also can significantly increase the country’s role in the security 
architecture of the Black Sea Basin. In view of the country’s strategic location and 
historical background, Moldova is well positioned to play a central role as an honest 
broker between the European Union and the East, contributing to its own and regional 
security. 
Distinguishing Moldova’s neutrality as armed is important because neutral states 
have the right to self-defense, as well as the obligations of avoiding taking part in 
conflicts or providing its territory for use by belligerents. In addition to the right to use 
armed capabilities in their defense, neutral states have the right to sign international 
treaties and ask for help in case of aggression.320  
Thus, starting from the idea that a neutral country must be in a position to secure 
its own neutrality and contribute to regional and global security, a policy of armed 
318 Alexandru Musteata, “The Neutrality of the Republic of Moldova - Stabilize or Destabilize 
Regional Security?” The Twenty Ten Theme, Alexandru Musteata Blog, 
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neutrality also is important for the Republic of Moldova to provide opportunities for 
military modernization and security optimization. 
The comparative study of Austria and Finland provides the Republic of Moldova 
a model for its own neutrality. Although the geopolitical situations in those countries are 
somewhat different from those in Moldova, a foreign policy of neutrality borrowed from 
these countries but crafted to suit the specific needs of Moldova could improve the 
country’s security through cooperation with the West and reduce associated costs through 
defense-sector reforms.  
While acting as a neutral country, defined by its obligation to defend its own 
neutrality, Austria pursued membership in international security organizations.321 By 
comparison, Finland’s geographic position near the Russian border shaped its neutrality 
status as a “defense solution”322 within its security doctrine while the country 
modernized and developed its armed capabilities.323  
Some experts argue that the Republic of Moldova cannot economically or 
politically afford the costs of armed neutrality.324 For example, in terms of defense 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP, today Moldova only spends 0.3 percent on 
defense,325 compared to Finland (1.36 percent),326 Austria (0.9 percent),327 and 
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322 Alina Florina Androne, “European Neutral Countries and the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy” (Bucharest: master’s thesis, Security Studies, University School of Sociology and Social 
Assistance, 2006), 35‒37. 
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Switzerland (3.0 percent.)328 However, if the Republic of Moldova were to pursue a 
foreign policy of armed neutrality, the cost of this policy could be shared by international 
partners. The country’s involvement in various international security programs also could 
facilitate the development of armed forces and benefit the training of its military and 
civilian personnel, increasing the capabilities of the national security structures.  
The Finnish experience of armed neutrality, however, provides the closest viable 
solutions for the Republic of Moldova. The Russian influence and NATO reticence are 
common situations between these two. In Finland’s case the majority of the population 
supports armed neutrality as a defense strategy.329 Additionally, Finland’s experience of 
joining the European Union and its neutral role in CSDP, NATO PfP cooperation, and 
UN contribution can serve as guidelines for the Republic of Moldova security 
development. Public opinion in Moldova also tends toward maintaining neutrality status, 
and political leadership supports a foreign policy of neutrality. According to Moldova’s 
Prime Minister Iurie Leanca:  
For the moment there is the Constitution which stipulates that Moldova is 
a neutral state, and polls show that most citizens favor of maintaining 
neutrality status. Also, to join the European Union is not compulsory to 
join NATO. Countries such as Finland and Sweden are not members of 
NATO, but are part of the EU.330 
Although Prime Minister Leanca mentioned that the situation in Moldova is now 
stable, and that there is no external risk from Romania and Ukraine, he also declared that 
the presence of Russian troops in Moldova is still an issue to solve.331 
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G. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS 
Although the neutrality status of the Republic of Moldova is not yet fully 
consolidated,332 the armed neutral concept can serve as a reasonable solution for the 
security of the country. However, implementation of such a policy of armed neutrality 
will require reforms and international recognition. A public relations campaign also is 
needed to inform Moldovan society about the benefits and risks of armed neutrality.  
Permanently neutral states are particularly sensitive to public opinion, at 
home as well as abroad. Their decision to seek security not in alliance but 
in a state of self-chosen, lasting neutrality must have the backing of an 
overwhelming majority of their own populations. It would not be 
sufficient to have the support of only a major part of the population: 
neutrality is a decision lightly taken or shed. It requires a consensus almost 
as well grounded, as extensive and widespread, as independence itself. 
The citizens of permanently neutral states must be deeply convinced that 
their status can protect their independence, security, and way of life better 
than alliance. They must also be ready to accept the burdens of neutrality: 
a filing of separateness and self-reliance; the recognition that neutrality 
requires not less but much more vigilance of the world scene; and last but 
certainly not least, the burden of an adequate Defense of their system, a 
military preparedness that must be, if anything, higher than that in a 
country whose security is protected by an alliance.333  
In Austria and Finland, “neutrality required a great deal of conceptual consistence 
and domestic unanimity.”334 Likewise in the Republic of Moldova, for a foreign policy 
of armed neutrality to be efficient, public opinion must be perfectly informed on the 
benefits and risks of neutrality. However, the presence of Russian troops in the disputed 
separatists Transnistrian region is an ever present remainder of the political limits of what 
can be publicly discussed and operationalized. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE EXPECTATIONS  
The modern security architecture requires a joint effort between states, and it also 
requires adjusting the national security strategies to this environment. However, given the 
security issues facing the Republic of Moldova, adopting a policy of armed neutrality 
may provide more security options and strategic alternatives in this regard. Such strategic 
positioning also could significantly increase Moldova’s role in the regional security of the 
Black Sea Basin. 
This thesis has attempted to analyze the political and military challenges that the 
Republic of Moldova faces as an armed neutral state in the regional security architecture 
of the Black Sea Basin. As a potential model for the Republic of Moldova, the analysis 
has included a study of how small and neutral states like Austria and Finland have 
ensured their national security. The basic analytic approach focused on security issues 
that shape the topic, focusing on various case studies and structured comparisons. 
The cross-national comparison and methodical framework was employed to 
assess the security results achieved by the neutral states in ensuring their security, and 
their contribution to regional and global security. The armed neutrality of small states 
may ensure their domestic, regional, and global security. This framework demonstrates 
that a variety of factors can influence national security, including the geopolitical 
situation, unresolved “frozen” conflicts, ethnic problems, developmental status, and 
energy dependence. The study also analyzed the positive and negative consequences of 
armed neutrality, concluding with an examination of the lessons learned from other states 
that can benefit the Republic of Moldova. 
The eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union has turned the Black 
Sea Basin into a region called by many scholars the “gatekeeper of the European 
identity.”335 In the ongoing ideological clash between East and West, the area has 
become characterized by numerous—and overlapping—partnerships, programs, and 
335 Ion Grosu, “Concluding Remarks,” in the Strategic Knowledge in the Wider Black Sea Area, edited 
by George Cristian Maior and Sergei Konoplyov (Bucharest: Editura RAO, 2011), 250. 
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projects geared toward stabilization and development, as well as preparation for 
integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Security cooperation—as well as economic, 
political, and military development—is now the main concern of the states in the Black 
Sea region. From a strategic and security perspective, 
the Black Sea is a meeting point of old risks and new challenges. It has a 
strategic relevance both from the perspective of the need to counter the 
complex security threats, and the possibility to capitalize on the security 
opportunities it poses. The Black Sea is a unique region connecting 
Europe and Asia, crossed by major energy corridors. It is also a platform 
for exporting stability and democracy towards Caucasus and Central Asia, 
especially against the background of serious security challenges, such as 
arms and drug trafficking (towards Europe), illegal migrations and 
organized crime, that juxtapose old threats (i.e., frozen conflicts) which 
lead to a new phrase when referring to the Black Sea security—“hybrid 
threats.”336 
The Republic of Moldova’s security role in this conglomerate setting of history, 
religion, culture, and geography is interconnected with other Black Sea states in the 
region. Joint security cooperation is the key. Developing and improving collaboration and 
Moldova’s defense capabilities are essential, especially now with “Russia’s aggressive 
actions against Ukraine.”337 The frozen conflict within its territory also has significantly 
deteriorated the regional security. Moldova, as the nearest country to Ukraine, is 
primarily concerned about its future security. The persistence of “transnational and multi-
dimensional threats”338 intersecting the European continent from the Middle East and 
Africa also jeopardize the security in the Black Sea Basin.  
Moldova’s security options are dependent on the country’s supreme law. Austria, 
Finland, and other European states adopted foreign policies of neutrality primarily to 
meet their security needs, proceeding from their geopolitical settings, country’s size, and 
the population’s desire for neutrality. Additionally, these neutral counties have never 
stopped modernizing their armed forces to protect their neutrality. However, some 
336 Grosu, “Concluding Remarks,” 250‒251.  
337 NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in 




                                                 
experiences from these neutral countries can serve as a plausible solution for the 
Republic of Moldova’s actual security struggle. Adopting such an armed neutral policy 
will offer Moldova more security options and opportunities for cooperation with 
neighboring countries and strategic partners. As a part of the Black Sea Basin, if the 
Republic of Moldova adopts a policy of armed neutrality, it will be positioned to 
participate in and contribute more actively to the regional security architecture.  
On the other hand, joining NATO, which is considered “the transatlantic 
framework for strong collective defense and the essential forum for security consultations 
and decisions among Allies”339 in the region, is still viewed with reluctance by a part of 
Moldova society. Although Moldova has maintained relations with NATO for more than 
two decades, the negative stereotype of NATO dating back from the Cold War period has 
persisted.340 This situation has resulted from a general lack of information about the 
advantages and the disadvantages of the NATO alliance, particularly due to 
misinformation in Moldova’s media space controlled by the Russia Federation.341 
However, the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine has made the Moldovan 
government think more gravely about the country’s security and defense capacity. During 
the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales,342 Moldova’s Minister of Defense highlighted the 
339 NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in 
the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales.”  
340 Voice of Bessarabia, “Lying Neutrality of the Constitution of Moldova,” Radio Voice of 
Bessarabia, September 5, 2014, http://voceabasarabiei.net/index.php/presa-romaneasca/25182-minciuna-
neutralitatii-din-constitutia-moldovei. 
341 Valentin Buda, “Republic of Moldova, Russian Disinformation Polygon. The Kremlin Trumpets 
Have Control of Three Quarters of the Media Space Controlled Theoretically by Chisinau,” Vezi.md 
Politics, http://www.evz.md/ro/politica/item/2588-republica-moldova-poligon-de-dezinformare-rusesc-
trompetele-kremlinului-detin-trei-patrimi-din-spatiul-media-controlat-teoretic-de-chisinau.html. 
342 NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in 
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales”; The 2014 NATO Summit came up with a new 
Defense and Security initiative for the Republic of Moldova, which is stipulated in article 89 of Wales 
Summit Declaration: “Today we have decided to launch a Defense and Related Security Capacity Building 
Initiative to reinforce our commitment to partner nations and to help the Alliance to project stability 
without deploying large combat forces, as part of the Alliance’s overall contribution to international 
security and stability and conflict prevention. The Initiative builds upon NATO’s extensive expertise in 
supporting, advising and assisting nations with Defense and related security capacity building. Building on 
our close cooperation and following their requests, we have agreed to extend this initiative to Georgia, 
Jordan, and the Republic of Moldova. We are also ready to consider requests from interested partners and 
non-partners, as well as to engage with international and regional organizations, with an interest in building 
their Defense and related security capacity through this demand-driven initiative.” 
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security concern of Moldova. Regarding this concern, NATO, the European Union, and 
Moldova’s other strategic partners have committed to supporting the country through 
various security initiatives.343 The official position of the Republic of Moldova about 
maintaining constitutional neutrality, which is shared by Moldova’s main political 
parties,344 was recently articulated by Prime Minister Leanca: 
Moldova is a neutral country. Neutrality gives us a solid foundation for 
solving the Transnistrian conflict and removes all security concerns from 
Russia. This proves that bringing Moldova closer to the European Union is 
not a threat to Russia’s security interests. We do not intend to create 
tension and unnecessary complications. We are not interested in a 
geopolitical discord. We attach this approach and we expect Russia to take 
steps in this direction. Also, we have a coalition government in which 
there may be different views. It is a normal process, which occurs in all 
countries with a multi-party system of government.345 
Thus, as long as a large part of society and the main political class sees neutrality as the 
optimal solution for ensuring state security,346 all future security options that Moldova 
would like to assume must result from this perspective. 
Regarding the EU-Moldova security perspectives, the processes are evolving 
along with the country’s aspirations of joining the union.347 The European CSDP 
promotes the EU military and defense intentions to insure common European security 
343 Ibid. 
344 Ina Croitoru, “Defense Minister First Time Invited to a NATO Summit,” Deschide.md Politics, 
http://www.deschide.md/ro/news/politic/4847/Ministrul-Ap%C4%83r%C4%83rii-INVITAT-%C3%AEn-
PREMIER%C4%82-la-un-summit-NATO.htm. 
345 Iuliana Enache, “Iurie Leanca Ensure Russia that Moldova Will Keep its Neutrality Status,” 
Mediafax.ro Foreign Affairs (translation by the author), http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/iurie-leanca-
asigura-rusia-ca-republica-moldova-isi-va-pastra-statutul-de-neutralitate-13231466. 
346 Center for Analysis and Investigations Sociological, Political, and Psychological CIVIS, 
“Barometer of Public Opinion Republic of Moldova March-April 2014,” Institute for Public Policy, 62‒63, 
http://www.ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/Brosura_BOP_04.2014_prima_parte_final-rg.pdf. 
347 Delegation of European Union to Moldova, “EU-Moldova Relations: Pursuing Common Goals 
from the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to the Association Agreement,” Europa.eu Moldova and 
EU, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/moldova/eu_moldova/index_en.htm; “Relations between the EU and 
Moldova have been guided by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the ENP Action Plan. Now, 
they will be replaced by the EU-Moldova Association Agreement (AA), including a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and an Association Agenda. The assistance to be provided 
during the programming period 2014–2020 is synchronized with the priorities and objective set out in the 
new Agreements. EU bilateral assistance to Moldova under the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) 
sharply increased from € 40 million in 2007 to € 131 million in 2014.” 
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through multilateral cooperation. This security framework also provides for the 
participation and contribution of non-EU states in this project.348 The Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) Article 21 on CSDP partnership states: 
[M]ultilateralism is at the core of the EU’s external action. The Union 
shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in 
the framework of the United Nations. There are few if any problems we 
can deal with on our own. The threats described are common threats, 
shared with all our closest partners. International co-operation is a 
necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral co-
operation in international organizations and through partnerships with key 
actors.349 
The European Security Strategy350 was approved in 2003, revised in 2008, and 
improved in 2009 with the Lisbon Treaty.351 The development of the CSDP reflects the 
complexity of the threats to European security.352 The strategy is based on the 
assumption that “no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its 
own.”353 Thus, the CSDP could involve non-EU and non-NATO countries in its security 
processes. For the Republic of Moldova, involvement in this security architecture will 
348 Europe Summaries of EU legislations, “European Security Strategy,” Summary, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_organised_crime/r00004_en
.htm. 
349 European Union External Actions, “Security and Defense CSDP,” CSDP Partnership, 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/partners/index_en.htm. 
350 Europe Summaries of EU Legislations, “European Security Strategy,” Summary, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_organised_crime/r00004_en
.htm; “The European security strategy was drawn up under the authority of the EU’s High Representative 
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and adopted by the Brussels European Council 
of 12 and 13 December 2003. It identifies the global challenges and key threats to the security of the Union 
and clarifies its strategic objectives in dealing with them, such as building security in the EU’s 
neighborhood and promoting an international order based on effective multilateralism. It also assesses the 
policy implications that these objectives have for Europe.” 
351 European Union External Actions, “Security and Defense CSDP,” About CSDP, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/index_en.htm. 
352 Council of the European Union, “European Security Strategy, a Secure Europe in a Better World, 
Brussels, December 12, 2003,” European Communities, 2009, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC7809568ENC.pdf. 
353 Ibid., 27. 
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allow the country to contribute more broadly to regional security, as well as benefit from 
the CSDP security mechanisms by developing Moldova’s security sector.354  
With this in mind, realizing the roles that the European Union and NATO can 
play as pivotal security providers in the region, the Republic of Moldova should reassess 
its security options. Accordingly, the country’s limited defense capabilities and 
economic, political, and energy dependence on the Russian Federation might require 
Moldova to adopt a policy of armed neutrality and collective security. Conclusions drawn 
from the research presented in this thesis additionally indicate that such political 
positioning may be the best option for small countries like the Republic of Moldova that 
are located in a tough neighborhood.  
Economic and energy dependence, the presence of a frozen conflict on its 
territory, and lack of control over the country’s eastern borders makes Moldova highly 
vulnerable to external pressures. These problems directly influence domestic and foreign 
policy. However, whatever security options are chosen by Moldova—either by 
continuing its European-integration process, by joining EU and NATO security systems, 
or by maintaining its neutrality status—adopting an armed neutral policy can be 
functional. Such a policy of armed neutrality will provide the country with the necessary 
tools to develop interoperability with the European Union and NATO in support of 
common regional security efforts. Adopting a policy of armed neutrality also will 
develop and increase Moldova’s defense capability to protect its neutrality if necessary.  
Although the study of other neutral states in Europe provides important historical 
and political data, it is well understood that what worked for them may not be the case for 
Moldova. The security of the Republic of Moldova is a specific case. Its struggle to 
ensure the country’s national security and contribute to regional security is immense. 
Nevertheless, one thing is certain: the Republic of Moldova will have to adjust its 
security to be economically, politically, and militarily competitive, taking into account its 
geostrategic positioning and the desire of Moldova’s people. 
354 Iurie Pîntea, Damien Helly, and Polina Panainte, Prospects for Moldova’s Cooperation within the 
Common Security and Defense Policy (Chisinau: Casa Editorial-Poligrafică “Bons Offices,” 2011), 7‒8. 
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